What Exactly Is Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula?

With the news that Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab was linked to, and possibly directed by, a group called Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), there’s much apprehension and confusion about this allegedly “new” offshoot of Osama Bin Laden’s group.

Though I’m usually not one to lead the charge against “the media”, I’ve been most disappointed by the lack of explanation about the differences in organization, targets, intentions, and capabilities between the group based in Yemen and the one along the Af-Pak border.

Let’s get the obvious but oft-unstated out of the way:  Though AQAP may trace some of its origins to the AQSL-directed 2000 bombing of the USS COLE, today AQAP is a distinct, separate entity from Osama Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda (which is commonly referred to throughout the intelligence community as Al Qaeda Senior Leadership, or AQSL).  AQAP may share a general ideological affiliation with AQSL, but - most significantly - its specific targeting intentions and attack capabilites may vary significantly.  Furthermore, AQAP’s leadership is largely independent to do as it pleases, and though it may receive occasional communications and guidance from Osama Bin Laden’s cadre, AQAP is essentially free to follow or ignore it as it may seem fit.

The best move AQAP is adopting the “al Qaeda” brand.  Franchising AQ is a no-brainer:  the group in Yemen and Saudi can not only entice finances and recruits to its organization on the al Qaeda name, but it also strikes fear world-wide as pundits, hosts, and articles flippantly repeat the name as if the group were under direct orders and possessed similar strike capabilities as Al Qaeda’s Senior Leadership back in 2001.

So what are AQAP’s intents and capabilities?  The group certainly shares an obvious anti-American/anti-”Western” bent, along with its Af-Pak based bretherin.  Since 2003, AQAP has launched several attacks against employees of Western petroleum countries, tourists, and the American embassy and consulate.  But whereas AQSL is focused on large-scale attacks against US soil, the Arabian Peninsula group has a primary motivation of toppling the Saudi and Yemeni regimes, and likely views these American/Western targets as not quite as important.

“But what about the Christmas Day plot?” you ask, “that seems like a pretty serious attempt to kill Americans on American soil.”  True, it does.  However, note that the plot failed.  It’s an important point because since successful terrorism plots are the marriage of a group’s intention to hit a particular target plus its capability to do so, on that score, AQAP failed.  It is quite easy to have a lone operative like Abdulmutallab volunteer to conduct an attack, and the groups leadership provide him the basic training and materiel to execute it.  But the fact that the bomber and explosives were incompetent and/or faulty respectively speaks volumes about AQAP’s lack of capability to conduct anything close to a 9/11 style attack from a Yemeni safe-haven.  Of course, since the group has displayed its intention to target Americans in America, the group should merit close attention for improving operational capability.

Yet AQAP still succeeded in exploiting the media value of even a failed operation.  And that, in a word, is amazing.  If we continue to let partisan political bickering drive security policy, then fledgling groups like AQAP continue to win as they gain fame and notarity.  It’s even more incredible that Republicans have the audacity to politically exploit nearly uncloseable gaps in America’s defensive net as it was their president who constructed its architecture in the first place.

Crossposted at The Progressive Fix.