Truman Series: Don’t Forget about the Bear.

This is the latest post in our series from Truman National Security Project Fellows.  Josh Tucker writes:

The Obama administration has a lot on its plate, but it shouldn’t forget about its Cold War adversary.  Russia can cause plenty of trouble for the United States – illustrated by its likely influence in the Kyrgyz president’s recent decision to close the US air base in his country – and three recent developments in Russian domestic politics unfortunately seem to point to this potential increasing in the future.

Like the rest of the world, Russia has been greatly affected by the economic crisis. While Russia has used economic policies in response, they have coincided with political actions.  First, the Constitution is in the process of being amended to increase the length of presidential terms from four years to six years. Second, a bill that eliminates jury trials for “crimes against the state” was quietly signed in to law at the end of 2008. Finally, a bill has been submitted to the Duma, backed by Prime Minister Putin and the ruling United Russia party to significantly expand the definition of treason that opponents fear could include basic opposition to the government. (As a side note, the treason bill has led to an extremely interesting development by contemporary Russian standards.  President Medvedev has – in apparent opposition to Prime Minister Putin – ordered the bill to be reviewed and reworked, a development that warrants close attention).

Taken in the context of the economic crisis, these measures suggest reason for concern. The Putin era of Russia politics has essentially represented a bargain: in return for economic prosperity, citizens were essentially asked to cede political control of the country to the Kremlin. Opposition parties were greatly weakened; much of the media – and especially television – came under the control of the authorities; and civil society generally found it harder to oppose the state.

As the economy deteriorates, it has become clear that the Kremlin will be unable to hold down its side of the bargain, which is undoubtedly going to lead to dissatisfaction on the part of the Russian population. Unfortunately, the Kremlin spent the past 8 years shutting down precisely those features of politics that are useful for allowing a disgruntled citizenry to voice its concerns in a constructive manner: opposition parties and a free press, to name but two. The Kremlin’s response? Set up a system where the President is even less accountable to the people, and make it easier to lock up people who oppose the government.

In the short term, then, it seems likely that the Russian state will become more repressive, which has potential to lead to more conflict with the US. First, there is likely to be more going on in Russia about which the US can complain, a perennial source of aggravation for the Russians. Second, it is going to become increasingly difficult for the Obama administration to “look the other way” while trying to work with Russia on points of mutual interest. Third, it is going to increase the temptation for the Kremlin to “blame the West” for domestic problems, and blaming the West is always easier when there are points of conflict with the West.

In the medium to long term, however, such a strategy may not work. While still a low possibility, there is a chance that Russia could witness serious social unrest, and possibly political upheaval. The new administration should not to be taken by surprise by such a development.

Joshua A. Tucker is an Associate Professor of Politics at New York University and a National Security Fellow at the Truman National Security Project.  The views expressed here are his own.