I just wrote this memo on personnel spending and the military.  Here’s the gist:

It’s not surprising that weapons systems draw all the attention when defense spending reform comes up. They translate into jobs that defense contractors spread cunningly across the nation’s states and congressional districts. But the “guns versus butter” debates between liberals and conservatives miss a key point. It’s not just weapons that drive defense spending through the roof — it’s the people, too.

According to its official budget, the Defense Department will spend $533.8 billion in 2010 in the following categories:

• Personnel: $136 billion
• Operations & Maintenance: $185.7 billion
• Weapons Procurement: $107.4 billion
• Research & Development for Weapons and Technology: $78.6 billion
• Other: $26.1 billion

The personnel figure, however, doesn’t come close to capturing what America is really spending on defense personnel. According to PPI’s calculations, the real price tag is much bigger: $301.1 billion each year, 121 percent higher than the Pentagon’s figure. In other words, if you want major savings in defense spending, cutting weapons systems and the ever-elusive “waste, fraud and abuse” won’t take you far enough.

McClacthy is reporting that the Obama administration has decided on a strategy that will involve sending at least 34,000 more American troops to Afghanistan. At present, this is a single-source story coming from at least two anonymous “U.S. officials” and has yet to be confirmed by the White House.  Separately, the Washington Post has reported that an announcement will be made “within days,” possibly in a prime-time address to the nation next Tuesday, December 1.

If the report proves to be true, it’s unfortunate that headline focused on the raw number of boots on the ground.  The Obama administration’s primary objective has been to formulate and enact a strategy, and then resource it properly.

Though there has not been news of which strategy the Obama administration will embrace, the reported 34,000 troop strongly suggests that it will adopt many of the strategic recommendations offered in General McChrystal’s August counterinsurgency (COIN) plan.  Strategy sessions in the White House may have refined McChrystal’s plan by focusing the COIN on 10 to 12 major population centers and Ambassador Eikenberry’s last-minute objections have clarified the administration’s exit strategy, but 34,000 more forces would endorse the meat and potatoes of McChrystal’s strategic outline.

Here at the PPI, we understand the American public’s weariness and skepticism at this announcement.  After eight years of war, many wonder why more progress hasn’t been made, and how many more American lives must be sacrificed.  It’s a tough choice, but we stand with the president in his decision to adopt much of General McChyrstal’s strategy as the best choice to offer definitive and lasting security to the country.

The General’s plan is hardly a guaranteed success, but it offers the highest possibility of permanently denying al Qaeda the safe haven it needs in a difficult and complex operating environment.  It also shows that the United States is committed to being a partner with the Afghan people against the Taliban, one of the most vile groups imaginable.

Even though it seems counter-intuitive, it is our firm belief that adopting McChrystal’s plan now is likely to stablize Afghanistan faster and ultimately permit American forces to come home sooner than if we remained strategically rudderless.  Or think of it this way:  if al Qaeda somehow regroups and executes another mass-casualty attack against the US, then we’re essentially back to square one, deciding anew how many more troops to send.

Any announcement of troop levels is likely to send shock-waves through the Democratic Congressional caucus.  The President will certainly have to make the rounds on the Hill to quell any impending revolt (including a possible war-tax).  However, as Will Marshall and I have reminded Democrats, it’s crucial that they support President Obama’s decision:

Whatever course he chooses, the President will need his party’s understanding and support to succeed. If Democrats fall out over Afghanistan, he won’t be able to sustain a coherent policy, and the public will likely lose confidence in the party’s ability to manage the nation’s security.

Competence in national security is part of being a full-spectrum governing party, and failure to protect the country would be a key indictment against Democrats.

For all those reasons, we welcome the president’s steadfast resolve and reasoned decision-making on this crucial national security issue.

Slightly different version cross-posted at TheProgressiveFix.

Lorelei Kelly at the New Strategic Security Initiative issues a thoughtful challenge to progressives over at the HuffPo:

If progressives really want to help forward the policy discussion, they should develop a set of alternatives premised on enduring commitment and solidarity with the Afghan people (local grants through the National Solidarity Program is a good example), and not pose them as a tradeoff for troop levels. Heck, even the commanding general in Afghanistan says this conflict has no military solution. Take that and run with it. But doing so means exercising forbearance when talking about the military presence. Uniforms are going to be part of the picture for a while. What the alliance is actually doing on the ground will determine the outcome. Tactics are already changing. But prioritizing civilians will mean that soldiers bear more of the risk.

We need to come to terms with that.

Any success must also include a significant shift in resources and coordination to make sure Afghans actually receive support to own their future. This kind of partnered consultation can start despite Karzai in office. The Afghan people know who isn’t corrupt. We need to go national and local at the same time because promising upstarts exist at both levels. The goal is a process — and so will be tough to measure, which is why a commitment is important. All sorts of policies here at home provide illustrations. From building the national highway system to public education, broadly distributed achievement through time take time. The laser-focused message the Afghan people need to hear is “we’re on this path with you.” We need to commit.

…

The president will put forward his decision soon. It will involve a troop increase. If progressives stay in full opposition mode, they will exist on the margin of the debate right when we need them setting the agenda. Exit to the sidelines will also undercut future efforts to advocate a new strategy for US security. We are moving from a time when we could contain threats to one where we must minimize them. This can only happen through sustained engagement.

The progressive community would do well to think twice about Lorelei’s words before blindly opposing a troop increase.  Code Pink has recognized it and moderated their position. After all, America’s military is in Afghanistan to protect the Afghan population and promote peace.  Those are progressive values.

(With apologies to Dennis Hopper and the no doubt wonderful screenwriters behind Speed)

Pop quiz, hot shot:  Who are Jean Claude Juncker and Herman Van Rompuy?

If you answered, “Two guys I met studying abroad in Florence my sophomore year,” you’d be close… but wrong.  And according to the BBC, you wouldn’t be alone in your ignorance — a smattering of man-in-the-street interviews produced hardly better results

Mr. Juncker and Mr. Van Rompuy are the prime ministers of Luxembourg and Belgium, respectively (and, if you trivia buffs need some extra ammo to entertain Aunt Betty around the dinner table on Turkey Day, here it is: Juncker, in power since 1995, is the longest serving head of state in Europe, I believe).  Both are in the running for the post of EU President, a new position created by the European Union when Ireland, the Czech Republic, and Poland finally ratified the Lisbon Treaty over the last several weeks.

The treaty’s backers argue that Europe has long-needed to speak with one voice on the world stage, thus the desire for a permanent president.  Up to now, the EU has had a rather ridiculous six-month rotating presidential terms, filled by the EU’s member states’ leaders.  The job is a thankless task - at 27 members, there are only a handful of issues that truly unite Europe’s political classes.  And some - like the Iraq war - are so divisive that they tear at the very fabric of European integration.

In most free and democratic countries - as are the EU’s members - major offices are chosen by the electorate.  Oddly, the first EU president won’t be.  Tonight, the EU’s 27 heads of state will lock themselves in a room, dine on the continent’s finest delicacies, sip (or slosh, if you’re one Mr. S. Berlusconi) its most prized wines, and pick one of their peers to hold the post.  All without a campaign poster in sight, or a public debate to be had.  That’s right - Europe’s first president will be chosen in the manner of Popes and Politburos, not democracies.  With no hope for this presidency, let’s hope the next is chosen by the voters.  After all, the EU’s parliamentarians are.

Tony Blair is also in the running for the post, but don’t expect him to get it.  When 27 extraordinarily powerful men and women sit down to choose someone to be - in one convoluted sense, anyway - their boss, they aren’t likely to pick a charismatic home-run hitter.  A quiet, controllable technocrat from Luxembourg or Belgium like Juncker or Van Rompuy is much more likely.

That tactic could backfire - look at Iraqi PM Nouri al-Maliki.  He was chosen in 2005 as a compromise candidate by ethnic powerbrokers; weak at first, al-Maliki has grown to be the most assertive force in Iraqi politics.  But then again, don’t count on it in Europe — megalomaniacs like Nicolas Sarkozy aren’t eager to be outshown by the new prez any time soon.

It seems like just yesterday - to surge or not to surge?

If you’re thinking it was just yesterday (literally), then you’ve got the wrong major American military deployment.  Not Afghanistan, but Iraq.  What a difference a year makes - at the heart of the presidential campaign debate on national security in 2008, Iraq has all-but-faded from public discussion.

So, to review:  Earlier this month, the Iraqi parliament passed an election law to govern the January 18, 2010 parliamentary vote.  The law theoretically resolved a handful of outstanding yet crucial issues that were needed to facilitate the vote, even though the UN’s man in Baghdad says pulling off the election by January would be a “herculean task“.  However, just today Iraqi President Jalad Talibani again threw the January poll in doubt by insisting, perhaps on behalf of his Sunni veep, that minority and refugee Iraqis needed greater representation in parliament.

The election is the last major hurdle to a US military withdrawal at the end of 2010 (save the 40,000-50,000 American troops hunkered down for training and counter terrorism operations).  Failure to conduct a legitimate election - and more importantly, to have the loser accept the results without resorting to more violence -  would potentially re-escalate sectarian strife as Iraq’s deep political wounds along ethic lines would be ripped open again.

Addressing and resolving the parties’ various complaints about the election law will be a major issue over the next few days.  Watch this space.

If you believe Tom Ricks’ analysis (and in this case, I happen to) there’s a good chance that violence in 2010 - at least against Iraq’s civilian population if not American military forces - will be the highest it has been in several years.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that one-off attacks are on the rise, with the occasional massive bombing like the August attack against the Iraqi Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance that killed some 155 people.  Groups proclaiming to be al Qaeda in Iraq - though probably composed of Sadam’s Ba’ath party loyalists - have claimed responsibility in several instances.  The good news?  Even though they carry the “al Qaeda” brand, they’re not intent on or capable of attack the US mainland.  The bad news?  They could be a major destabilizing force in Iraq for years to come, because…

… The US military has pulled back from cities and towns - as stipulated in the Status of Forces Agreement - and is now in a supportive roll to Baghdad’s forces, which seem none-too-hurried to ask for American help.  What’s more, the cash used to flip the Sunni Sons of Iraq to cooperate with Iraqi/American forces has dried up as the task of distributing payment has fallen to the Iraqi government.

Or, to cut all this down to a nice, tidy phrase used by the Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction’s (SIGIR’s) quarterly report from October 2009:

The security picture in Iraq remains mixed.”

As for reconstruction itself, SIGIR points to several positive developments in oil infrastructure development, but nothing will be really resolved until a comprehensive revenue-sharing agreement among the Sunnis, Shi’ites, and Kurds for hydrocarbons is passed.

That’s a ton to chew over.  Here’s what I think all this means: If the election is held come January and the Iraqi security forces are able to at least contain violence, then the US will able to stick to the plan.  American troops will be substantially reduced from 120,000 to 50,000 by the end of 2010.  This is no small feat and there are a few major hurdles before it happens.  However, if it does, allow me to bastardize a Churchillian phrase and say it would represent the beginning of the end.

Nixon to China, it ain’t.  But President Obama’s three-day swing through Shanghai and Beijing presents an interesting opportunity to make real headway on three critical trans-Pacific fronts.

First is economics.  Whether the issue is China’s near recession-proof economy, currency devaluation, or seemingly inexhaustible appetite for American debt, Obama has been walking tight rope to frame financial competition as a healthy companion to cooperation.  While it’s perhaps somewhat natural for Americans to “fear” Chinese economic hedgemony, keep this in mind:  China has to keep growing at a rate of close to 8 percent annually, or it won’t be able to integrate its approximately 20 million brand new job seekers each year.  The potential instability could wreak havoc, so on some level (American debt notwithstanding) Chinese growth should be managed rather than ignored or fought.

Second is world leadership, specifically on climate change.  I was listening to a BBC podcast this morning that highlighted China’s fascinating and divisive internal debate on its place in the world, with various cadres within the governing Communist party arguing for relative isolation over front-running.  This is where Obama’s message can strike home:  The world needs China as a global leader as other countries look to Washington and Beijing before making their move.  Take climate change - the Indias, Brazils, and Russias of the world see little reason to agree to any wide-ranging world-wide carbon restrictions if China doesn’t play ball first.

Finally, many will paint the president’s visit as too soft on his Chinese hosts — Obama refused a visit in DC with the Dalai Lama and has been rather publicly quiet (though not silent) on the issue of human rights.  For the record, human rights must be a part of the conversation, both as a moral issue and bargaining chip (as base as that may sound).  Obama has been rather careful to present them as one of many agenda items, but one that doesn’t needlessly anger Beijing and derail important conversations on issues America needs a Chinese partern now.

Danger Room has a great scoop:

Salman Al-Awdah, a Saudi cleric who played an influential role in Usama Bin Laden’s early radicalism, called the Fort Hood shootings “irrational” and an “empty thought”. Al-Awday said, “Incidents [such as the Ft. Hood shootings]  have bad consequences, and undoubtedly this man might have a psychological problem; he may be a psychiatrist but he [also] might have had psychological distress.”

Though UBL had once described Al- Awdah as his “ideal personality,” the cleric has somewhat moderated his stance recently, having condemned 9/11 even while subsequently signing a 2004 letter that called for jihad against US forces in Iraq.

It’s a notable differentiation — in the past, Al-Awdah has distanced himself from terrorism targeting civilians, while endorsing military ones.  Even though Ft. Hood was technically not in the field of battle, many of its soldiers were headed out to Iraq or Afghanistan, or just returning home. You’d think Al-Awdah would view them as culpable as forces in a war zone.

I’ve written previously that I don’t believe Ft. Hood was terrorism.  That Al-Awdah passed on an opportunity to legitimize the attack - instead emphasizing Nidal Hassan’s mental illness - only underscores my analysis.