US out of Iraq’s cities, where does Iran sit?
If this isn’t sitting on a knife’s edge, then I don’t know what is.
Today, the US military says syonara to Iraq’s cities and towns, pulling back to their relatively isolated FOBs (”Forward Operating Bases”), which sit removed from the average Iraqi’s daily life. Why is this a big deal? It represents a return to a pre-surge military posture. “The surge” was many things, but more than a blanket increase in the number of American troops, it was a change in mentality - one that morphed from the US military protecting its own ass to protecting Iraqis’. Read Tom Ricks “The Gamble” and you’ll see why. In a nutshell, the military went from hiding far away from Iraq’s cities, villages, and towns, to living - quite literally - among them. This positioning built confidence with Iraqis, leading them to cooperate with the Americans, viewing them as a mechanism to decreaing violence, not an obstacle.
Today reverses that posture.
Interesting that Tom Ricks is a huge stinking pessimist about our prospects for success:
My worry is that I don’t see the political situation as being much different than it has in the past. Nothing much has changed from the previous rush to failures. As readers of this blog have seen me say before: the surge succeeded tactically but failed strategically. That is, as planned, it created a breathing space in which a political breakthrough might occur. But Iraqi leaders, for whatever reason, didn’t take advantage of that space, and no breakthrough occurred. All the basic issues that faced Iraq before the surge are still hanging out there: How to share oil revenue? What is the power relationship between Shia, Sunni and Kurd? Who holds power inside the Shiite community? What is the role of Iran, the biggest winner in this war so far? And will Iraq have a strong central government or be a loose confederation? And what happens when all the refugees outside the country and those displaced inside it, who I think are majority Sunni, try to go back to their old houses, now largely occupied by Shiites and protected by Shiite militias?
A secondary issue is how Iraqi forces will behave once they are operating without American forces watching them. There are a lot of “Little Saddams” in Iraq. That didn’t used to be our problem-but now these guys have been trained, equipped and empowered by us.
I hope I am wrong, and that Iraq really is embarking on a new course this week. But I don’t think so. So I think the real question now is: How fast will the unraveling occur?
Yours truly is more optimistic, but very cautiously so. I appreciate the lack of political accommodation, and agree that without it, tensions will continue to simmer in throughout the political factions.
But one of the aspects that Ricks fails to account for is how the Iranian election has effected Tehran’s ability to maintain influence on the ground in Iraq. Is Iran’s attention so focused on internal politics now that the phone line to its Iraq-sponsored militias has been figuratively cut?
Posted in Iran, Iraq, PPI, US foreign policy | 1 Comment »