Andrew Exum - of Abu Muqawama and CNAS - has a provocative but incomplete piece up on TNR that dissects the one area of the Obama Afghanistan plan that seems lacking:  the internet.

And while some terrorists–such as Mohammed Sadiq Khan, who is believed to have masterminded the 7/7 bombings–travelled to Pakistan and trained in militant camps, the common denominator that has emerged from domestic terror threats in places like the United Kingdom is that their staging ground was actually on the internet rather than in a physical “safe haven.”

The White House strategy, though, betrays an obsession with physical space at the expense of virtual space. This fixation very much reflects a generational divide among the scholars and policy-makers who focus on terrorism. …

But as Europe’s experience has shown us, this thinking is outdated; we shouldn’t wait until we are attacked by homegrown or internet-coordinated terrorists to adopt an appropriately far-reaching strategy.

He’s right, but only to a degree.  It’s correct to signal that we absolutely need to do a better job monitoring and disrupting potential jihad-laden communications on the internet.  But Exum is wrong if to believe, as his article implies, that the 7/7 bombers relied uniquely on their Yahoo accounts to plan the operation.  Ditto for the Madrid plot of March 11, 2004.

I was the lead DoN counter-terrorism analyst for those plots.  It’s safe to say the internet complimented and facilitated those operations, you can’t assemble a bomb online.  Contrary to Exum’s implications, the 7/7 bombers had a physical location to stage the plots - a safe-house in Leeds - where the home-made explosives were assembled.  The Madrid bombers had an apartment in the Leganes neighborhood of that city (pictured here).  When the cell was discovered, Spanish police raided the building, at which point the bombers killed themselves and several officers by detonating the left-over explosives.

The internet serves as a platform for a lot of the rha-rha motivational stuff, but the hard-core operational planning simply doesn’t occur there.  Osama Bin Laden doesn’t have an email account;  neither does Ayman al Zawahiri.  Instead, top-level AQ planning for the biggest plots (and even smaller Europe-based operations) occurs largely through an intricate person-to-person network of couriers passing handwritten notes.  Why?  Quite simply, they know we’re listening.

We can learn a lot from monitoring and policing potential jihad-related content online.  I’d hesitate to think that we’re going to crack any hardened, capable networks that way.

UPDATED to include link.

Ilan Goldberg at DA has a good take on the revisionist history going on in conservative circles.  There’s a lot of back-slapping amongst them, “thankful” that Obama has adopted “their” model.  Let’s just remember who was saying what way back when Read the rest of this entry »

How will we know “success” in Afghanistan? There’s been some notable criticism around the internets that Obama’s AF/PAK strategy lacks a certain degree of defined goals.  Here’s a Q and A with Bruce Reidel, the Obama administration’s point-man on the AF/PAK strategic review:

Q Can you go through the benchmarks, please? What are they? Who set them and who will determine whether the benchmarks are being met?

MR. RIEDEL: The benchmarks is a process that’s just beginning. We have not established them. Let me say that this strategic review is a road map for moving forward; it’s a strategy. It’s not intended to be a campaign plan or a straitjacket.

We will develop benchmarks across the board. Some of these are fairly obvious, like levels of violence, levels of casualties, periodicity of suicide bombings both in Afghanistan and Pakistan — those kind of benchmarks that you measure any conflict by. Those are some that are pretty obvious. There are going to be other ones about moving against corruption; there will be other ones about the speed with which we build up the Afghan army and the success rate of building the Afghan army.

So the benchmarks process is not something that’s locked in stone today. It’s something that we’re only at the beginning phase of starting to work on.

Q Well, will the benchmarks be just for Afghanistan, or will they also be for any kind of progress being made in western Pakistan?

MR. RIEDEL: The President feels very strongly that this strategy needs to be flexible and adaptable, and that to the extent possible, we develop metrics — and you heard him use that word in the speech — that give you an idea of our success rate. He wants to reevaluate periodically how we’re doing, what’s working, what’s not working, make mid-course corrections and adjustments.

Fair enough - that’s some unconvincing explaining.   In Iraq, for example, readily apparent data - like numbers of military and civilian deaths - of course indicate that the country is less violent today than it was yesterday.   … Which is a kind of success.  But do hard data like this really indicate our overall achievements?  Eh.

Unfortunately, a broad definition of “success” simply can’t be measured by a few keybenchmarks and over-hyped anecdotes.  Rather - like pornography - we’ll just know “success” when we see it.

The Democratic Party’s internal debate over the use of force has haunted it since 1968.  That year, the Democratic split on the issue provided Republican candidates an opportunity to exploit appearances of “weakness” for their political advantage.  They did successfully for 40 years.

No more.

In 2009, the Democrats have nullified any conservative advantage in the national security debate.  With recent Republican statements on Afghanistan and Iraq, its clear that moderate progressive policies are have broad appeal across the vital center of American politics.

Don’t believe me?  Just look at what the Republican leadership is saying:

Sen. John McCain on Meet The Press yesterday (via Politico):

Politico: McCain pleased with Obama Afghan plan

McCain said Obama’s strategy will prevent Afghanistan from becoming a base for terrorists.

“I think the outlines of this proposal are good. The best way to get out of Afghanistan fast is people to think we’re staying,” McCain said.

Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell in the National Journal:

There are significant numbers of them [terrorists] in Afghanistan and in Pakistan and I think the president is adopting a policy that gives us a chance to succeed. Are we going to be able to turn Afghanistan into a western style democracy? No. But can we stabilize the country and protect America from another attack here on the homeland? I think so. And I think the policy the president is pursuing are likely to be supported by virtually all Republicans.”

House Minority Leader John Boehner in the Hill:

“I support the [Afghanistan] strategy the president unveiled today because it reflects the advice of our commanders on the ground,” said House Minority Leader John Boehner (R-Ohio). “I hope he will continue to honor their counsel because we should not allow political considerations here at home to trump the importance of achieving success in the region.”

In some ways, though hardly all, this looks a bit like Dems who lined up to support George Bush and the Iraq war.  When the contentiousness of that position became apparent, Obama’s candidacy in the primary soared.  If things go south in Iraq or Afghanistan, I’d guess the Republican who opposes Obama’s Iraq and Afghanistan strategy (note:  not commitment, but strategy) to the conflicts will have significant gravitas come 2012.  Right now, I just can’t find that person - Bobby Jindal, Sarah Palin, Mitt Romney, or Tim Pawlenty haven’t said much on the matter.  Maybe it’s an obscure state representative somewhere…

Either way - and though things can change - if nothing else, Obama has done a great service to his party by adopting progressive, pragmatic national security policies that have blunted historic Republican campaign advantages.

Just when you thought it was safe to wrap things up in Iraq, the WaPo has a must-read piece this morning that previews a potential break-down in intra-Iraqi reconciliation.  It pits the US-backed government against the (previously) US-backed Awakening movement.

Very generally speaking, the Awakening is the group of Sunni militias that had aligned with al Qaeda in Iraq until the US military started paying them to essentially switch allegiances and help police their own communities.  This act is seen as a crucial part of the counter-insurgency strategy that has decreased violence over the past 18 months.

But the arrest of a high-profile Awakening member on corruption charges has sparked violence and offered a preview of life after America’s presence in Iraq:

BAGHDAD, March 29 — A new and potentially worrisome fight for power and control has broken out in Baghdad as the United States prepares to pull combat troops out of Iraq next year….

On Sunday, Iraqi soldiers backed by U.S. combat helicopters and American troops swept into a central Baghdad neighborhood, arresting U.S.-backed Sunni fighters in an effort to clamp down on a two-day uprising that challenged the Iraqi government’s authority and its efforts to pacify the capital. But the fallout from the operation is already rippling far beyond the city’s boundaries. Both the Iraqi security forces and the Sunni fighters, known as the Awakening, are cornerstones in the American strategy to bring stability. …

The clashes also opened a window onto the new military relationship emerging between the United States and Iraq, as well as the struggles Iraq’s government will probably face as it takes more control over security.

Let’s cut to the chase.  What’s really going on here?  The arrests of Awakening members - probably very legitimate arrests - have merely been the catalyst for violence:

Awakening fighters across Iraq had the same list of complaints: They had gone without their $300-a-month salary for two, sometimes three, months; the government was trying to marginalize them; and their leaders were being arrested on dubious charges.

The complaints are the latest hallmarks of a wider trend — Iraqi PM Maliki’s government is trying to consolidate power by smashing the competition.  Read the rest of this entry »

I have an article up on RealClearWorld today previewing the president’s trip to Turkey this week.  Here a link to the whole thing, but the text is pasted below as well:

How to Handle the ‘G-Word’ with Turkey

By Jim Arkedis

President Obama’s early-April trip to Turkey is an important reminder that America has allies that are both Muslim and (mostly) democratic. It will also prove a test of the new president’s diplomatic mettle.

As the president’s first trip outside North America, the visit highlights Turkey’s rapidly ascending position in America’s foreign policy. The United States needs Turkish support on a diverse and critical range of issues: supplying soldiers to Afghanistan; negotiating with Iran; mediating talks between Israel and its Arab neighbors; exporting oil from the Caspian region; and providing a military exit-route from Iraq.

But then there’s the g-word, *genocide* - the one issue that could skunk Ankara’s mood to cooperate. In 1915, modern Turkey’s Ottoman predecessors massacred some 1.5 million ethnic Armenians and displaced some 500,000 more.Turkish governments object to the term “genocide,” insisting that the chaos of the Ottoman Empire’s breakup prevented any coordinated mass killing.

At issue is President Obama’s pledge - when he was Candidate Obama - to “recognize the Armenian genocide” if elected. The other end of Pennsylvania Avenue hasn’t let him forget it. Read the rest of this entry »

Jeff Steing at SpyTalk raises a great anecdote to illustrate a government-wide problem:  cooking the books.  More on that in a second.

In government, there’s very little accountability.  Trust me, I’ve been there.  But managers like to create a sense of accountability in order to show their bureaucratic bosses that they’re doing a heckuva job.  The term metrics get thrown out there a ton - the idea that well-tracked data that will indicate success.

The problem with government metrics is that they emphasize quantity over quality.  No one cares if you write take your time and write a great report - they’d much prefer that you write ten average ones so you can quantify how hard you’re working.

My spidey-sense started to tingle when I read this Obama quote this morning about Afghanistan:

“In going forward,” he said, “we will not blindly stay the course,” but will monitor progress with a series of benchmarks and metrics imposed on Pakistan, Afghanistan and U.S. efforts. “

Basically, his team has promised the boss a bunch of numbers.  Some of it will be accurate - like how many attacks per month - but I wouldn’t be surprised if much of it is inflated, poorly-researched numbers coupled with feel-good anecdotes designed to convince the Commander-In-Chief that the everyone’s doing a good job.

Keep this in mind when you read Jeff Stein’s anecdote:

Before Eikenberry leaves for Kabul, he should drive up the road from the Pentagon and see Rufus Phillips.

Phillips was a CIA man who spent more time in South Vietnam than Ho Chi Minh. Not draining cocktails in Saigon with well-pressed colonels, either — in the villages.

Phillips ran something called the Hamlet Evaluation Survey, which crunched all sorts of numbers about how the war was going.

And he knew it was b.s.

In 1963 he had the guts to tell the President of the United States, John F. Kennedy, that his generals in Vietnam were cooking the books. The fancy stats showing the villagers on our side, served up by the Saigon command, were inflated — made up, he told Kennedy.

Younger Army officers who told the truth were having their careers ruined. U.S. military advisors who complained about corrupt South Vietnamese officers were being sent home.

It was “a remarkable moment in the American bureaucracy, a moment of intellectual honesty,” the late, great David Halberstam wrote in “The Best and the Brightest,” his monumental account of White House advisors who turned a low level counterinsurgency into a big-unit war with almost 600,000 troops, only to see victory slip away.

…

So this is President Barack Obama’s 1963 moment. The roof started to cave in Saigon, when Kennedy had only 16,000 advisors in-country.

Who will be Obama’s Rufus Phillips?  Who will give him the facts — not the balderdash Eikenberry served up.

The president might start with Richard Holbrooke, who cut his teeth with the State Department in Vietnam in 1962.

Don’t laugh: The president’s point man on Afghanistan — and suddenly much more, according to The Washington Independent’s Spencer Ackerman — wrote the forward to Phillips’s last book, “Why Vietnam Matters: An Eyewitness Account of Lessons Not Learned.”