David Brooks, oh how you are a dying breed: The rational, thoughtful conservative who holds true to his core values while having the humility to actually grant the other guy a point.

He also may have a man-crush on the president.  That’s why it is perhaps not so surprising that Brooks’ most recent column follows up on a point I made a few days ago:  That Barack Obama’s foreign policy is grounded in thoroughly progressive values.  Here’s an excerpt:

In 2002, Obama spoke against the Iraq war, but from the vantage point of a cold war liberal. He said he was not against war per se, just this one, and he was booed by the crowd. In 2007, he spoke about the way Niebuhr formed his thinking: “I take away the compelling idea that there’s serious evil in the world and hardship and pain. And we should be humble and modest in our belief we can eliminate those things. But we shouldn’t use that as an excuse for cynicism and inaction.”

His speeches at West Point and Oslo this year are pitch-perfect explications of the liberal internationalist approach. Other Democrats talk tough in a secular way, but Obama’s speeches were thoroughly theological. He talked about the “core struggle of human nature” between love and evil.

More than usual, he talked about the high ideals of the human rights activists and America’s history as a vehicle for democracy, prosperity and human rights. He talked about America’s “strategic interest in binding ourselves to certain rules of conduct.” Most of all, he talked about the paradox at the core of cold war liberalism, of the need to balance “two seemingly irreconcilable truths” — that war is both folly and necessary.

Brooks used the term “liberal internationalism” to describe Obama’s approach.  Your friends here at the PPI have a different version of the phrase, preferring “progressive internationalism”.  Though some of this manifesto is dated to a time when Iraq was clearly beginning to unravel, here’s what the PPI said back in 2003 before I drew my paycheck from around these parts:

Progressive internationalism stresses the responsibilities that come with our enormous power: to use force with restraint but not to hesitate to use it when necessary, to show what the Declaration of Independence called “a decent respect for the opinions of mankind,” to exercise leadership primarily through persuasion rather than coercion, to reduce human suffering where we can, and to create alliances and international institutions committed to upholding a decent world order.

The Obama administration has taken a lot of heat for supposedly being “too realist” in its approach to foreign policy.  Certainly there’s evidence to support that claim:  Brooks says the White House “misjudged the emotional moment when Iranians were marching in Tehran” or there was the uncomfortable incident when Hillary Clinton side-stepped the issue of human rights in China because they “couldn’t interfere with the global economic crisis” (which she recently tried to rectify in a speech at Georgetown). True enough, at least for now.

However, when books are written on the Obama administration’s foreign policy, I’d bet the driving mind-set will be one that identifies and resolves discrete national security interests, underpinned by keen attention to America’s values.  Closing Guantanamo is perhaps the best example thus far.

A cleaned-up version of this post is over at the ProgressiveFix.com

I was struck by the unexpected tone of President Obama’s Nobel Peace Prize speech — instead of spending the entire address laying out a vision to achieve world peace, he instead spend the first half addressing the odd position in which he finds himself: receiving this prize while serving as Commander-in-Chief of a nation involved in two wars.

In the process, he laid out the most compelling ideological foundation for a progressive view on national security I have heard him ever give:

We must begin by acknowledging the hard truth that we will not eradicate violent conflict in our lifetimes. There will be times when nations – acting individually or in concert – will find the use of force not only necessary but morally justified.

I make this statement mindful of what Martin Luther King said in this same ceremony years ago – “Violence never brings permanent peace. It solves no social problem: it merely creates new and more complicated ones.” As someone who stands here as a direct consequence of Dr. King’s life’s work, I am living testimony to the moral force of non-violence. I know there is nothing weak –nothing passive – nothing naïve – in the creed and lives of Gandhi and King.

But as a head of state sworn to protect and defend my nation, I cannot be guided by their examples alone. I face the world as it is, and cannot stand idle in the face of threats to the American people. For make no mistake: evil does exist in the world. A non-violent movement could not have halted Hitler’s armies. Negotiations cannot convince al Qaeda’s leaders to lay down their arms. To say that force is sometimes necessary is not a call to cynicism – it is a recognition of history; the imperfections of man and the limits of reason.

I raise this point because in many countries there is a deep ambivalence about military action today, no matter the cause. At times, this is joined by a reflexive suspicion of America, the world’s sole military superpower.

Yet the world must remember that it was not simply international institutions – not just treaties and declarations – that brought stability to a post-World War II world. Whatever mistakes we have made, the plain fact is this: the United States of America has helped underwrite global security for more than six decades with the blood of our citizens and the strength of our arms. The service and sacrifice of our men and women in uniform has promoted peace and prosperity from Germany to Korea, and enabled democracy to take hold in places like the Balkans. We have borne this burden not because we seek to impose our will. We have done so out of enlightened self-interest – because we seek a better future for our children and grandchildren, and we believe that their lives will be better if other peoples’ children and grandchildren can live in freedom and prosperity.

This is where progressives should stand on national security:  we must acknowledge that there is evil in the world and show a resolve to make tough choices when America’s vital national security interests are at stake.  Our preference is to not use force, but when all other options have been exhausted and our security remains directly threatened, force may be the last resort.

Though we would prefer that

Though Iranian negotiators accepted a nuclear deal this week in Vienna, even the most naive optimists should contain their excitement until the mullahs back in Tehran approve of it, and then the thing is actually executed.

Here are the logistics:

Iran is running low on uranium-derived fuel used in medical facilities (for MRIs, among other things).  The country has enough uranium, but it’s not in the right form for medical uses and will run out before Tehran can enrich enough.  Therefore, Iran had to look to the international community.

The U.S., France, and Russia proposed that Iran export the bulk of its uranium stock to Russia for enriching to the required medium-grade level (ie, lower than weapons-grade).  Russia then sends it on to France, who fashions it into fuel-plates.

On paper, the deal is a win-win:  Iran gets its fuel but gives up most of its uranium.  It will be almost another twelve months before it rebuilds its uranium stock to be able to attempt enriching it to weapons-grade (highly enriched).  Or, as Joe Cirincione of the Ploughshares Fund says,

If Iran ships the uranium out of the country, we’ve lengthened the fuse.”

Note that big “if”.  There is the distinct possibility that Tehran is playing for time by negotiating this draft plan to decrease tensions in the short term by stringing along the U.S., France, and Russia.  It’s always good to remember that actions speak louder than words.

However, Russia’s involvement in this process is critical - the Kremlin had appear divided on whether to support sanctions against Iran.  Now that Moscow has partial ownership of this deal, non-compliance by Tehran should anger Medvedev and Putin, who might be more disposed towards pressure.

Anne Applebaum theorizes in the Washington Post that NATO is essentially useless:

There is almost no sense anywhere that the war in Afghanistan is an international operation, or that the stakes and goals are international, or that the soldiers on the ground represent anything other than their own national flags and national armed forces. …

The fact is that the idea of “the West” has been fading for a long time on both sides of the Atlantic, as countless “whither-the-Alliance” seminars have been ritually observing for the past decade. But the consequences are now with us: NATO, though fighting its first war since its foundation, inspires nobody. The members of NATO feel no allegiance to the alliance, or to one another.

Questions surrounding NATO’s relevance have swirled since any semblance of progress had stalled in Afghanistan.  The alliance’s inability to keep members focused and actively engaged in the hard- and soft- power components of the mission is due to a variety of factors, not the least of which is the Bush administration’s neglectful resourcing of the conflict in favor of Operation Iraqi Freedom (a non-NATO mission, it should be noted).  And this is something of a tragedy, given NATO’s invocation of Article V (stating an attack on one member is an attack on all members) in the wake of September 11, 2001.

However, it is also true that NATO was not conceived to conduct an Afghan-type mission, particularly one lasting nine years.  NATO was born, of course, as a security pact to face down the Soviet Union–a known quantity whose strength drew from its traditional military capabilities.  The potential threat coming from Afghanistan’s hinterland is a far cry from the Cuban missile crisis.

While Applebaum bemoans the “countless ‘whither-the-Alliance’ seminars”, I’d suggest that such discussions are necessary, if ill-timed.  Instead, NATO’s Secretary General, ex-Norwegian Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, should squeeze out every possible commitment NATO countries are willing to devote to the Afghan mission in the short term, reminding them that attacks in the United Kingdom and Spain highlight the necessity to take the Obama administration’s refocused efforts there seriously.

When the Afghanistan mission is wrapped up in several years, NATO must sit down and decide when it is appropriate to fight, and what sort of resources its members are willing to commit.

Is the Army using a shell game to give a false impression of its recruiting success?

That’s a dangerous accusation, but a critical issue.  In light of President Obama promise on the campaign trail to increase the end-strength of the military by 92,000 troops (65,000 for the Army alone), the Army’s numbers should accurately reflect how they’re doing.

Last week, the Pentagon issued a press release stating the Army had not only met, but actually exceeded its recruiting goals for FY2009.  Then Army Maj. Gen. Donald Campbell thumped his chest in the Washington Post soon thereafter, crediting the Army’s number of recruiters on the ground as a critical component of its success.

Unfortunately, the Army is using some creative accounting to trumpet its success.  To meet its goals, the Army simply lowered them–by ten thousand less new recruits in 2009 (vs. 2008), and ten thousand fewer re-enlistments.  Or, as Fred Kaplan notes in Slate:

[T]he Army this year lowered not only the recruitment goal but the retention goal too, from 65,000 in 2008 to 55,000 in 2009. And it actually held on to fewer soldiers than it did in either of the last two years (68,000 in 2009, compared with 72,000 in 2008 and 69,000 in 2007).

So here is the situation. The secretary of defense ordered, and Congress authorized, an expansion in the size of the Army. But the Army reduced the recruitment goal—and reduced the retention goal. The size of the Army is in fact shrinking. It may look as if it’s growing—the Pentagon report gives the impression it’s growing—but it’s growing only in comparison with the officially set goals.

For Army “recruitniks” (a term usually applied to my friends’ insatiable desire to follow Charlie Weis’ efforts to cajole 18 year old kids to play college football at Notre Dame), this dichotomy comes as little surprise.  In an excellent expose in September, the National Journal makes two key points about the Army’s recruits:

Never before has the Army had so many soldiers with so much experience; never before have so many soldiers been so exhausted.

The article concludes,

Today’s Army may be equal to the U.S. population in its demographic representation, but it is also separate.

And it is getting more so all the time. That reduces the chance that declining public support for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan will cause Army morale to collapse, as it did in Vietnam. Still, it raises a different danger. “I don’t think they’re going to get burned out,” said retired Col. Patrick Lang, a Vietnam veteran. “But they’re going to get harder and harder, and more detached from the values of civilian society.”

Unless the military puts out an honest assessement of where it’s recruiting is, none of these problems will be fixed any time soon.

The Nobel Peace Prize Committee’s decision to bestow this year’s award on President Obama is both an endorsement and a challenge.

The prize is an endorsement of Obama’s idea of what America should be. We may be the world’s strongest power, but America should have the strength to listen and lead, not order and ignore. Obama’s America listens as much as it speaks, it projects specific and achievable long-term goals for world peace, and it isn’t afraid to tell friends and enemies alike that peace is achievable but only by making unpopular choices. More than empty words, Obama’s engagement is buttressed by a hard-nosed realism that is interested in acting as much as talking.

Would President Obama have won if he wasn’t immediately preceded by George W. Bush? Likely not — the differences in their ideologies, temperament, and interpretation of American power would probably not have been enough if the contrast hadn’t been sharply juxtaposed by historical proximity. But then again, would an African-American Democrat with little governing experience have been elected president without that contrast?

The prize is also a challenge, both to Obama and to the international community. Obama was inaugurated only two weeks before nominations for the prize were closed, suggesting that it was Obama’s idealistic hope on the campaign trail that won him consideration at the outset. His first months in office have inspired billions, but the next three years pose the challenge of turning hope into results.

His international partners have likewise been challenged. With Obama buoyed by the prestige of the prize, the burden to work for peace has shifted to them. It would normally be difficult to say no to the world’s most popular leader. How much tougher would it be now that he’s won the Nobel Peace Prize?

Let’s play word association. I say “UN sanctions”, and you think… what? “Weak”, “useless”, “waste of time”?

If you didn’t chose one of those, I bet your answer was somewhere in the neighborhood. My sense is that Americans are generally skeptical of imposing sanctions - UN or US - on despotic regimes because their ineffectiveness dents Americans’ self-image. Here we are, the most powerful military, economic, and cultural force in the world, and petty dictators thumb their collective noses at us by surviving - even thriving - under sanctions year after year while their populations feel the effects. Paging Mr. Castro… Mr. F. Castro… you have a call on the white courtesy phone.

Of course, Fidel is joined by his friends in Pyongyang, Tehran, and - for a time - Baghdad, at least until we grew so sick of Saddam skirting around the stupid things that we sure showed him, didn’t we?

So I’ll bet you shook your head disapprovingly as you read that for a fourth time, the United States is working to draw up a new list of sanctions against the Iranian regime if Iran chooses not to seriously engage the international community on their highly suspect nuclear program this Thursday in Geneva.

While there are no guarantees that these sanctions will force Iran to the bargaining table or to give up the kitchen sink on its nuclear program, I believe that this round of sanctions has a better chance of working than any previous attempt.

Here’s why they could - repeat could - be more successful in forcing Iran into serious negotiation on its nuclear program:

1. Remember the goal. It’s to force Iran into serious negotiations on its nuclear program. If sanctions have even the possibility of crippling Tehran, Iran may decide it’s better to talk things through.

2. The Iran regime is hurting right now. Iranian President Ahmadinejad stole an election in June. Everyone knew it, and massive street protests followed. This has left his regime in a precariously fragile spot - cross the electorate again, especially with economic penalties, and expect more headaches if not curtains.

An important caveat here: if the international community plays its hand wrong, the regime could rally Iranians around it while blaming the UN for economic hardship. So caution - and a way to talk to the Iranian street - is at a premium.

3. What they target: These sanctions target Iran’s gas imports. Wait, Iran imports gas? I thought they were sitting on mounds of the stuff… Well, yes, they are. However, Iran does not have the capacity to refine enough to bring to its domestic market. So, Tehran imports some 40 percent of its consumption. And cutting off the supply will drive up the price at the pump…

4. Who’s on board: Previous UN attempts to sanction Iran haven’t exactly been bear-claw tight. That’s because - though they were passed through the UN Security Council - they had to be watered down to avoid Russian and Chinese vetoes.

That may be changing. Russia has indicated that it may be sympathetic to harsher sanctions, despite recent ambiguity on the subject by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. If Russia can be swayed to support stiff sanctions on oil and gas, they would be used as leverage to pressure China into getting on board. Chinese thirst for Iranian oil continues to be a major obstacle, but it is at least conceivable that China could be brought along under the right circumstances.

Now go back and read #1 - Iran may decide to avoid any gamble with popular instability. Success is hardly assured, but with a few breaks the right way, it’s conceivable that Iran might view the lesser of two evils as negotiation when faced with an unpredictable domestic situation. Remember: the sanctions themselves don’t have to work, but it’s the real threat of them working that counts.