The Whos down in Whoville might almost be jealous of Portici - a town of some 60,000 residents near Naples, Italy - whose mayor, Vincenzo Cuomo declared that Christmas decorations would be banned in public this year.

And why would Whoville necessarily be jealous of this decidedly anti-festive decree?  Because at least the good mayor has a reason to justify his actions: In Whoville, the Grinch stole Christmas out of spite; in Portici, Mayor Cuomo’s policy is at least trying to break a mafia funding scheme.

The crackdown on tinsel, Mr. Cuomo says, is the latest front in his battle against the Camorra, the Naples-based mob known for its brutality and economic savvy.

When the Christmas season comes around — and holiday shopping picks up — the town sees a spike in payments of the pizzo, or protection money. The “pizzo di Natale,” as Christmas-time payments are called, is commonly carried out through the forced sale of overpriced decorations — from Advent calendars to poinsettias — by the Camorra to shopkeepers.

So far, so good, though the mafia aren’t usually ones for taking such aggressive attempts to curb their power lightly.  Two months ago, the mayor received a bullet from an AK-47 in the mail.  Bill O’Reilly:  Eat your heart out - this is a very different, yet very real War on Christmas whose consequences, even localized to a medium-sized town in southern Italy, are far more important that your invented culture war.

Over the course of the past week, the Swedish government, which currently holds the EU’s soon-to-be-extinguished rotating presidency, suggested that the European Union’s foreign ministries declare Jerusalem a divided city and the future capital of a Palestinian state.  The draft statement also implied that the EU would recognize a unilateral Palestinian declaration of statehood.

The Israelis reacted harshly, and lobbied the Europeans to water down the statement to say “If there is to be a genuine peace, a way must be found (through negotiations) to resolve the status of Jerusalem as the future capital of two states.”

Even the more mild declaration hasn’t exactly received much enthusiasm either from the Israeli side, while garnering divided support between the Arab League and Palestinian Authority.

Skeptics say that Sweden’s attempt at forging European unity was a cynical attempt to leave a legacy from its last crack at the EU presidency (with the advent of Herman Von Rompuy’s more permanent ascent to that post) to either show symbolic solidarity with Palestine or to forge a joint European position on an important issue.

And though the Palestinians are of course content to receive international backing, let’s be honest: This effort at joint European diplomacy looks like amateur hour and risks further destabilizing an already fragile process.

A few months ago, I had lunch with a friend involve in European social democratic circles.  He said (and I’m paraphrasing), “Europe can’t do anything on the diplomatic front with Israel/Palestine, but if America can broker a deal, we are ready and anxious to pay for the whole thing: security, development, trade… you name it.”

My friend was right - Europe hasn’t invested much diplomatic capital in the Middle East peace process.   Issuing public and controversial statements of questionable utility could only upset - and in the worst case, undo - the hard, delicate, behind-the-scenes work of the American administration.

We’d love for Europe to pay; but for now, we’d also love for them to shut-up.

(With apologies to Dennis Hopper and the no doubt wonderful screenwriters behind Speed)

Pop quiz, hot shot:  Who are Jean Claude Juncker and Herman Van Rompuy?

If you answered, “Two guys I met studying abroad in Florence my sophomore year,” you’d be close… but wrong.  And according to the BBC, you wouldn’t be alone in your ignorance — a smattering of man-in-the-street interviews produced hardly better results

Mr. Juncker and Mr. Van Rompuy are the prime ministers of Luxembourg and Belgium, respectively (and, if you trivia buffs need some extra ammo to entertain Aunt Betty around the dinner table on Turkey Day, here it is: Juncker, in power since 1995, is the longest serving head of state in Europe, I believe).  Both are in the running for the post of EU President, a new position created by the European Union when Ireland, the Czech Republic, and Poland finally ratified the Lisbon Treaty over the last several weeks.

The treaty’s backers argue that Europe has long-needed to speak with one voice on the world stage, thus the desire for a permanent president.  Up to now, the EU has had a rather ridiculous six-month rotating presidential terms, filled by the EU’s member states’ leaders.  The job is a thankless task - at 27 members, there are only a handful of issues that truly unite Europe’s political classes.  And some - like the Iraq war - are so divisive that they tear at the very fabric of European integration.

In most free and democratic countries - as are the EU’s members - major offices are chosen by the electorate.  Oddly, the first EU president won’t be.  Tonight, the EU’s 27 heads of state will lock themselves in a room, dine on the continent’s finest delicacies, sip (or slosh, if you’re one Mr. S. Berlusconi) its most prized wines, and pick one of their peers to hold the post.  All without a campaign poster in sight, or a public debate to be had.  That’s right - Europe’s first president will be chosen in the manner of Popes and Politburos, not democracies.  With no hope for this presidency, let’s hope the next is chosen by the voters.  After all, the EU’s parliamentarians are.

Tony Blair is also in the running for the post, but don’t expect him to get it.  When 27 extraordinarily powerful men and women sit down to choose someone to be - in one convoluted sense, anyway - their boss, they aren’t likely to pick a charismatic home-run hitter.  A quiet, controllable technocrat from Luxembourg or Belgium like Juncker or Van Rompuy is much more likely.

That tactic could backfire - look at Iraqi PM Nouri al-Maliki.  He was chosen in 2005 as a compromise candidate by ethnic powerbrokers; weak at first, al-Maliki has grown to be the most assertive force in Iraqi politics.  But then again, don’t count on it in Europe — megalomaniacs like Nicolas Sarkozy aren’t eager to be outshown by the new prez any time soon.

Though Iranian negotiators accepted a nuclear deal this week in Vienna, even the most naive optimists should contain their excitement until the mullahs back in Tehran approve of it, and then the thing is actually executed.

Here are the logistics:

Iran is running low on uranium-derived fuel used in medical facilities (for MRIs, among other things).  The country has enough uranium, but it’s not in the right form for medical uses and will run out before Tehran can enrich enough.  Therefore, Iran had to look to the international community.

The U.S., France, and Russia proposed that Iran export the bulk of its uranium stock to Russia for enriching to the required medium-grade level (ie, lower than weapons-grade).  Russia then sends it on to France, who fashions it into fuel-plates.

On paper, the deal is a win-win:  Iran gets its fuel but gives up most of its uranium.  It will be almost another twelve months before it rebuilds its uranium stock to be able to attempt enriching it to weapons-grade (highly enriched).  Or, as Joe Cirincione of the Ploughshares Fund says,

If Iran ships the uranium out of the country, we’ve lengthened the fuse.”

Note that big “if”.  There is the distinct possibility that Tehran is playing for time by negotiating this draft plan to decrease tensions in the short term by stringing along the U.S., France, and Russia.  It’s always good to remember that actions speak louder than words.

However, Russia’s involvement in this process is critical - the Kremlin had appear divided on whether to support sanctions against Iran.  Now that Moscow has partial ownership of this deal, non-compliance by Tehran should anger Medvedev and Putin, who might be more disposed towards pressure.

Anne Applebaum theorizes in the Washington Post that NATO is essentially useless:

There is almost no sense anywhere that the war in Afghanistan is an international operation, or that the stakes and goals are international, or that the soldiers on the ground represent anything other than their own national flags and national armed forces. …

The fact is that the idea of “the West” has been fading for a long time on both sides of the Atlantic, as countless “whither-the-Alliance” seminars have been ritually observing for the past decade. But the consequences are now with us: NATO, though fighting its first war since its foundation, inspires nobody. The members of NATO feel no allegiance to the alliance, or to one another.

Questions surrounding NATO’s relevance have swirled since any semblance of progress had stalled in Afghanistan.  The alliance’s inability to keep members focused and actively engaged in the hard- and soft- power components of the mission is due to a variety of factors, not the least of which is the Bush administration’s neglectful resourcing of the conflict in favor of Operation Iraqi Freedom (a non-NATO mission, it should be noted).  And this is something of a tragedy, given NATO’s invocation of Article V (stating an attack on one member is an attack on all members) in the wake of September 11, 2001.

However, it is also true that NATO was not conceived to conduct an Afghan-type mission, particularly one lasting nine years.  NATO was born, of course, as a security pact to face down the Soviet Union–a known quantity whose strength drew from its traditional military capabilities.  The potential threat coming from Afghanistan’s hinterland is a far cry from the Cuban missile crisis.

While Applebaum bemoans the “countless ‘whither-the-Alliance’ seminars”, I’d suggest that such discussions are necessary, if ill-timed.  Instead, NATO’s Secretary General, ex-Norwegian Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, should squeeze out every possible commitment NATO countries are willing to devote to the Afghan mission in the short term, reminding them that attacks in the United Kingdom and Spain highlight the necessity to take the Obama administration’s refocused efforts there seriously.

When the Afghanistan mission is wrapped up in several years, NATO must sit down and decide when it is appropriate to fight, and what sort of resources its members are willing to commit.

William Prescot, an American General in the War of Independence, might have had a different take.  Prescot is the military genius attributed with saying, “Don’t fire until you see the whites of their eyes.”  But should he have been straddling a battlefield against a cadre of well-endowed Swedes, he may have uttered, “Don’t fire until you see them trying to reattach their highly flammable brassieres!”

It’s every 15 year old boy’s fantasy come wildly true: Swedish military womens’ bras are coming unhitched at the most inappropriate times.  It has caused the 500-odd women in Sweden’s armed forces to issue a complaint against their apparently sub standard-issue bras.

But with some 1000 female conscripts scheduled to join up next year, no worries - Stockholm is hard at work developing a “new battle safe bra.” Consulting on the project is Mr. Austin Powers, apparently for his developped expertise in spotting “machine gun jubblies.”

My erstwhile co-author Josh Tucker penned a cogent piece for RealClearWorld today on the Russian missile shield.  Here’s his point:

So the bottom line is as follows: (1) it is unclear how these interceptors would have improved U.S. national security; (2) it is unclear how the interceptors would have improved the security of American allies in Eastern Europe; (3) they would have been expensive (note Obama’s mention of “cost-effectiveness” in his statement on the matter); (4) we don’t know if they would have worked (note Obama’s emphasis on the effectiveness of his proposed alternative); and (5) they would have continued to provide a serious impediment to improving U.S.-Russian relations. …

But let’s be clear: this is not a costless decision. Anytime we change our minds on military commitments to allies, there are costs down the road for doing so. Both Poland and the Czech Republic have born serious costs in order to move this plan along with their own populations — neither of which were uniformly enthusiastic about these proposals, especially in the Czech Republic. I would hope the administration would take damage control in this regard very seriously….

Finally, it is important not to overestimate the effect of this decision on U.S.-Russian relations. Yes, this will remove a thorn from that relationship, and an important thorn at that. And it is possible that we may even see some reciprocal move on Russia’s part in terms of ratcheting up pressure on Iran in the coming days; there have long been indications that such a deal might be possible.

… The Russians should take comfort in the fact that the current administration is willing to listen to arguments about the value of particular policy decisions, but they should in no way take away from this an overinflated sense of Russian influence over Washington’s foreign policy.

That’s about right by me.  I like his point of emphasis on damage control - we’ve made a decision whose effects within the Polish and Czech military establishments is potentially wide-ranging.  We should expend a decent amount of energy managing that relationship, trying to assuage those countries’ governments’ level of uncomfortableness.

For example, Czech Foreign Minister Jan Kohout said he made two concrete proposals to U.S. officials on Thursday in hopes of keeping the U.S.-Czech alliance strong: for the U.S. to establish a branch of West Point for NATO members in Central Europe and to “send a Czech scientist on the U.S. space shuttle to the international space station.” Those requests should be taken seriously.