Let’s play word association. I say “UN sanctions”, and you think… what? “Weak”, “useless”, “waste of time”?

If you didn’t chose one of those, I bet your answer was somewhere in the neighborhood. My sense is that Americans are generally skeptical of imposing sanctions - UN or US - on despotic regimes because their ineffectiveness dents Americans’ self-image. Here we are, the most powerful military, economic, and cultural force in the world, and petty dictators thumb their collective noses at us by surviving - even thriving - under sanctions year after year while their populations feel the effects. Paging Mr. Castro… Mr. F. Castro… you have a call on the white courtesy phone.

Of course, Fidel is joined by his friends in Pyongyang, Tehran, and - for a time - Baghdad, at least until we grew so sick of Saddam skirting around the stupid things that we sure showed him, didn’t we?

So I’ll bet you shook your head disapprovingly as you read that for a fourth time, the United States is working to draw up a new list of sanctions against the Iranian regime if Iran chooses not to seriously engage the international community on their highly suspect nuclear program this Thursday in Geneva.

While there are no guarantees that these sanctions will force Iran to the bargaining table or to give up the kitchen sink on its nuclear program, I believe that this round of sanctions has a better chance of working than any previous attempt.

Here’s why they could - repeat could - be more successful in forcing Iran into serious negotiation on its nuclear program:

1. Remember the goal. It’s to force Iran into serious negotiations on its nuclear program. If sanctions have even the possibility of crippling Tehran, Iran may decide it’s better to talk things through.

2. The Iran regime is hurting right now. Iranian President Ahmadinejad stole an election in June. Everyone knew it, and massive street protests followed. This has left his regime in a precariously fragile spot - cross the electorate again, especially with economic penalties, and expect more headaches if not curtains.

An important caveat here: if the international community plays its hand wrong, the regime could rally Iranians around it while blaming the UN for economic hardship. So caution - and a way to talk to the Iranian street - is at a premium.

3. What they target: These sanctions target Iran’s gas imports. Wait, Iran imports gas? I thought they were sitting on mounds of the stuff… Well, yes, they are. However, Iran does not have the capacity to refine enough to bring to its domestic market. So, Tehran imports some 40 percent of its consumption. And cutting off the supply will drive up the price at the pump…

4. Who’s on board: Previous UN attempts to sanction Iran haven’t exactly been bear-claw tight. That’s because - though they were passed through the UN Security Council - they had to be watered down to avoid Russian and Chinese vetoes.

That may be changing. Russia has indicated that it may be sympathetic to harsher sanctions, despite recent ambiguity on the subject by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. If Russia can be swayed to support stiff sanctions on oil and gas, they would be used as leverage to pressure China into getting on board. Chinese thirst for Iranian oil continues to be a major obstacle, but it is at least conceivable that China could be brought along under the right circumstances.

Now go back and read #1 - Iran may decide to avoid any gamble with popular instability. Success is hardly assured, but with a few breaks the right way, it’s conceivable that Iran might view the lesser of two evils as negotiation when faced with an unpredictable domestic situation. Remember: the sanctions themselves don’t have to work, but it’s the real threat of them working that counts.

We’ve heard this all before, right?  That the UN is about to “get tough with Iran” for its nuclear program.  Three times previously the world’s governing body has imposed sanctions on Tehran for its hush-hush uranian enrichment facilities, and three times previously those sanctions have been generally ineffective, focusing on items like arms sales and financial assets hidden abroad.

But this time, the UN is serious.  Really.  The difference is in the proposed sanctions’ target:    Iran’s imported gasoline.  You might object by stating that Iran has plenty of its own gas, and why would the mullahs possibly need to import any? Seems silly, even.  But a critical lack of petroleum refineries in-country means that Iran actually buys some 40 percent of its commercial-ready fuel from abroad.  Blocking those imports would significantly increase prices for electricity and transportation.  The UN is hoping that the resulting public outcry from higher prices could prove to be the action-forcing mechanism that gets Tehran to the nuclear bargaining table.  The good news is that Ahmadinejad has signaled a willingness to talk, even if he claims that Iran’s nuclear program is off the table.  Gasoline sanctions might just open up that topic as well.

Of course, the UN is running a risk - Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez has promised to export 20,000 barrels a day of refined gasoline to Iran to provide a strategic reserve cushion before sanctions take effect.  It’s unclear whether that’s enough to dampen the price-rises, but if so, Ahmadinejad may attempt deflect public anger at West for his country’s ills.

But this time, your average Iranian is in a less tolerant mood.  Following June’s sham presidential election and subsequent massive street protests, Ahmadinejad’s attempts to pin the sanctions on Washington will fall on more skeptical, and perhaps outright distrustful, ears.  Under the right conditions, it’s conceivable that Ahmadinejad could misread the public mood entirely and re-ignite June’s protests.

That’s why these sanctions are the right move:  Iran probably wants to talk, and the sanctions put a price on Iranian inaction.  Furthermore, they target Iran’s pressure point better than their predecessors, and do so at a time when Tehran is on shakey ground with its public.

The following is a guest-post from Michael Derham, a fellow of the Truman National Security Project:

While most of us were recovering from the after-effects of “the World’s #1 Michael Jackson Tribute band” Sunday morning, in sunny Tegucigalpa the Honduran military stepped in and told President Manuel Zelaya to beat it. He has been replaced by the recent head of the Congress, Roberto Micheletti, a political opponent despite nominally being member of the same party. Like so many Latin American coups, while the details of the event were funny (Zelaya was sent packing to Costa Rica in his pajamas), the greater implications are not so humorous.

Zelaya was elected three years ago on a center-right ticket but in his time in the office swung him to the left, aligning himself with Hugo Chávez. But while those who previously supported Zelaya might not be thrilled with the direction he’s taken politically, it’s his questionable move to go for a second term — disallowed under the Honduran constitution–that caused the military to move against him. The coup occurred the morning of a planned non-binding referendum ordered by Zelaya against the wishes of the Honduran Congress.

Zelaya called the referendum on whether to re-draw the constitution to give him another four years. While Zelaya has been downplaying the nature of the referendum - after the coup he was describing it to BBC as a poll “like Gallup would conduct” - his opponents saw that he would use any expression of public support for another term as leverage to compel Congress to call a binding referendum this fall. The Supreme Court issued an order for his arrest, which lead the army to act.

Once Zelaya was whisked off to gilded exile in Costa Rica, the Organization of American States closed ranks to condemn the coup and called for Zelaya to serve out his term, still recognizing him as legitimate president. This is opposed to the rash actions of others in the region, notably Hugo Chávez. Chávez is giving truth to the phrase “only fools rush in.” He is supposed to have sped to ally Nicaragua last night to meet with Zelaya to lend his support. In the early hours after the coup, Chávez was on his nationally televised TV show “Aló Presidente” saying he was going to invade Honduras.

Unlike Chávez and others calling for hasty action, the Obama administration has walked a fine line. Reports indicate that as the crisis was culminating, US officials were working behind the scenes to resolve the situation in a peaceful, constitutional manner. The Obama administration has rightly supported the OAS, and has called the coup for what it is. Smartly, Secretary of State Clinton has emphasized that economic aid will continue to one of the poorest countries in the hemisphere, while the Honduran military, which has a strong relationship with (’dependence on’ might be a better phrase) the US will likely be frozen out of additional aid. But Secretary Clinton has held off on moving to cut aid to give Honduran actors the opportunity to work towards a peaceful solution of the crisis.

While one can question the wisdom of Zelaya’s policies or his motivation for seeking a second term, the solution imposed by the military is worse than the problem. While during the Cold War such a coup might get the quiet backing from international supporters, today the Micheletti government is finding itself isolated internationally - even from neighbors El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua, which have cut off trade relations with Honduras.  Alone, and with Zelaya to speak at the UN today , the Micheletti government will likely be forced to back down.  A likely outcome would be a compromise, where Zelaya is allowed to return and serve out his term, with the understanding that his attempts to seek a second term are at an end. That could come as soon as Thursday, when Zelaya has planned to return to Honduras, in the company of the Secretary General of the OAS.

Derham is a writer living in New York City.  He specializes in Latin America, finance, and economics.  The views expressed here are his own.

I wonder if how much of an impact this type of airlift actually makes.  And is it sustainable?  I fear that this is a one-time shot that makes for a good news story but has limited, temporary impact:

KIGALI, Rwanda, Jan. 14, 2009 – The U.S. Air Force has begun airlifting Rwandan peacekeeping equipment and supplies from here to Sudan’s Darfur region as part of a United Nations-African Union peacekeeping mission….

Each aircraft carried about 30 tons of cargo. In all, the Air Force will transport more than 150 tons of equipment and supplies, including nine oversized vehicles, water purification systems, water trailers, tents and spare parts.

... and as a side note:

The mission also represents the first large-scale peacekeeper support mission for U.S. Africa Command since it was formally activated Oct. 1.

From the press release:

The Norwegian Nobel Committee has decided to award the Nobel Peace Prize for 2008 to Martti Ahtisaari for his important efforts, on several continents and over more than three decades, to resolve international conflicts.

Throughout all his adult life, whether as a senior Finnish public servant and President or in an international capacity, often connected to the United Nations, Ahtisaari has worked for peace and reconciliation. For the past twenty years, he has figured prominently in endeavours to resolve several serious and long-lasting conflicts. In 1989-90 he played a significant part in the establishment of Namibia’s independence; in 2005 he and his organization Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) were central to the solution of the complicated Aceh question in Indonesia. In 1999 and again in 2005-07, he sought under especially difficult circumstances to find a solution to the conflict in Kosovo. In 2008, through the CMI and in cooperation with other institutions, Ahtisaari has tried to help find a peaceful conclusion to the problems in Iraq. He has also made constructive contributions to the resolution of conflicts in Northern Ireland, in Central Asia, and on the Horn of Africa.

I have passively followed Ahtisaari’s work over the last decade or so.  His contributions in attempting to resolve Kosovo’s status stand out the most — he showed great patience when dealing with Russia. 

In a discussion with a friend the other day, I predicted Kofi Annan would win for his work resolving the Kenya crisis (of course, a good food-for-oil scandalor two might delay or cancel any chance Annan ever had).  I hoped Thabo Mbeki’s half-hearted, opaque attempts at mediation in Zimbabwe wouldn’t. 

I’m happy to be wrong on both counts.  Ahtisaari’s award falls in the “life-time achievement” category.  Rather than parachute diplomacy, I suppose we should be pulling for the type of un-flashy, steady hand he’s had over the decades. 

Of all the first world economies, the situation in Iceland may be the most precarious.  We talk about “meltdown” in the US, but that’s a spring day compared to the Icelandic thaw.  It’s gotten so bad that a personal friend in Reykjavik relayed that some have cautioned of food and fuel shortages.  There’s even talk of the krona - Iceland’s currency - “losing it’s function as a medium of payment.”  That’s bad.

But today, it got worse.  Short of cold, hard cash, Iceland turned to Moscow:

REYKJAVIK (Reuters) - Iceland took over its second largest bank, propped up a battered currency and sought on Tuesday a 4 billion euro ($5.44 billion) loan from Russia to help tackle a crisis threatening to overwhelm the island nation.

Russian Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin said Moscow viewed positively the request from Iceland, whose premier said it had faced a risk of “national bankruptcy.”

“The result will be announced after negotiations,” Kudrin said.

Prime Minister Geir Haarde said Icelandic officials would travel to Moscow on Tuesday or Wednesday to discuss terms for the loan to bolster the country’s foreign reserves.

But here’s were it gets really interesting:  Iceland is competing against Turkey and Austria for a temporary seat on the UN Security Council.  Two of those three will get seats, and with the loan, none are looking particularly attractive — Iceland could be beholden to the Russians, Turkey’s human rights record isn’t exactly stellar, and Austria just elected two extreme right parties in last month’s elections.