Though Iranian negotiators accepted a nuclear deal this week in Vienna, even the most naive optimists should contain their excitement until the mullahs back in Tehran approve of it, and then the thing is actually executed.

Here are the logistics:

Iran is running low on uranium-derived fuel used in medical facilities (for MRIs, among other things).  The country has enough uranium, but it’s not in the right form for medical uses and will run out before Tehran can enrich enough.  Therefore, Iran had to look to the international community.

The U.S., France, and Russia proposed that Iran export the bulk of its uranium stock to Russia for enriching to the required medium-grade level (ie, lower than weapons-grade).  Russia then sends it on to France, who fashions it into fuel-plates.

On paper, the deal is a win-win:  Iran gets its fuel but gives up most of its uranium.  It will be almost another twelve months before it rebuilds its uranium stock to be able to attempt enriching it to weapons-grade (highly enriched).  Or, as Joe Cirincione of the Ploughshares Fund says,

If Iran ships the uranium out of the country, we’ve lengthened the fuse.”

Note that big “if”.  There is the distinct possibility that Tehran is playing for time by negotiating this draft plan to decrease tensions in the short term by stringing along the U.S., France, and Russia.  It’s always good to remember that actions speak louder than words.

However, Russia’s involvement in this process is critical - the Kremlin had appear divided on whether to support sanctions against Iran.  Now that Moscow has partial ownership of this deal, non-compliance by Tehran should anger Medvedev and Putin, who might be more disposed towards pressure.

Read Joe Klein’s up-close-and-personal take on Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad:

[F]or those of us who sat with Ahmadinejad, the real headline was his apparent cluelessness. … It is well known that Ahmadinejad doesn’t have operational control over the nuclear program or Iranian foreign policy — that resides with Supreme Leader Ayatullah Ali Khamenei — but the exact extent of his powers, beyond management of the domestic economy, remains a mystery. He did not seem very powerful to us. His answers to our questions were sometimes opaque, often blatantly false, though not confrontational. Almost every question brought forth a flurry of crib notes hastily scribbled and shoved in his hands by his advisers. It was all very odd.

Let’s play word association. I say “UN sanctions”, and you think… what? “Weak”, “useless”, “waste of time”?

If you didn’t chose one of those, I bet your answer was somewhere in the neighborhood. My sense is that Americans are generally skeptical of imposing sanctions - UN or US - on despotic regimes because their ineffectiveness dents Americans’ self-image. Here we are, the most powerful military, economic, and cultural force in the world, and petty dictators thumb their collective noses at us by surviving - even thriving - under sanctions year after year while their populations feel the effects. Paging Mr. Castro… Mr. F. Castro… you have a call on the white courtesy phone.

Of course, Fidel is joined by his friends in Pyongyang, Tehran, and - for a time - Baghdad, at least until we grew so sick of Saddam skirting around the stupid things that we sure showed him, didn’t we?

So I’ll bet you shook your head disapprovingly as you read that for a fourth time, the United States is working to draw up a new list of sanctions against the Iranian regime if Iran chooses not to seriously engage the international community on their highly suspect nuclear program this Thursday in Geneva.

While there are no guarantees that these sanctions will force Iran to the bargaining table or to give up the kitchen sink on its nuclear program, I believe that this round of sanctions has a better chance of working than any previous attempt.

Here’s why they could - repeat could - be more successful in forcing Iran into serious negotiation on its nuclear program:

1. Remember the goal. It’s to force Iran into serious negotiations on its nuclear program. If sanctions have even the possibility of crippling Tehran, Iran may decide it’s better to talk things through.

2. The Iran regime is hurting right now. Iranian President Ahmadinejad stole an election in June. Everyone knew it, and massive street protests followed. This has left his regime in a precariously fragile spot - cross the electorate again, especially with economic penalties, and expect more headaches if not curtains.

An important caveat here: if the international community plays its hand wrong, the regime could rally Iranians around it while blaming the UN for economic hardship. So caution - and a way to talk to the Iranian street - is at a premium.

3. What they target: These sanctions target Iran’s gas imports. Wait, Iran imports gas? I thought they were sitting on mounds of the stuff… Well, yes, they are. However, Iran does not have the capacity to refine enough to bring to its domestic market. So, Tehran imports some 40 percent of its consumption. And cutting off the supply will drive up the price at the pump…

4. Who’s on board: Previous UN attempts to sanction Iran haven’t exactly been bear-claw tight. That’s because - though they were passed through the UN Security Council - they had to be watered down to avoid Russian and Chinese vetoes.

That may be changing. Russia has indicated that it may be sympathetic to harsher sanctions, despite recent ambiguity on the subject by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. If Russia can be swayed to support stiff sanctions on oil and gas, they would be used as leverage to pressure China into getting on board. Chinese thirst for Iranian oil continues to be a major obstacle, but it is at least conceivable that China could be brought along under the right circumstances.

Now go back and read #1 - Iran may decide to avoid any gamble with popular instability. Success is hardly assured, but with a few breaks the right way, it’s conceivable that Iran might view the lesser of two evils as negotiation when faced with an unpredictable domestic situation. Remember: the sanctions themselves don’t have to work, but it’s the real threat of them working that counts.

It hasn’t been easy going of late for Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran’s illegitimate president.

First came the summer repression - in the wake of a fraudulent election, Ahmadinejad spent most of his time repressing an internal revolution as hundreds of thousands took to the streets in mass protest.

Up next was this week’s speech to the general assembly of the United Nations, where Ahmadinejad carried on about alleged Jewish desires to start a new form of slavery, charges that prompted a mass walk-out by many of the world’s major powers.

It’s tough to mix such bombast with dented credibility under normal circumstances.  But the hits keep on coming for the regime in Tehran:  The U.S., Britain, and France have just revealed  knowledge of a secret Iranian underground nuclear facility near the holy city of Qom.

We call this getting caught with your pants down.

Iran tried to limit the damage by preemptively notifying the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency in advance of the tri-lateral announcement in Pittsburgh, but to no avail.  Iran was hiding a facility, and even if it proved to be of the benign civilian power variety, the burden of proof now falls squarely on the mullahs’ shoulders.  Perhaps this is why Ahmadinejad left the door cracked open at the end of his unsettling UN address with a pledge “to shake all those hands which are honestly extended to us.”

The Obama administration should be salivating:  Iran’s damaged legitimacy at home and abroad likely make it more willing to engage in meaningful dialogue about its nuclear program.  And with Russia recent indication of support for sanctions - a bonus, repeat bonus, outcome from chosing to strengthen American security by abandoning missile defense in Eastern Europe in favor of a sea-based system - there is a real chance of leveraging broad international pressure to move Iran.  (And indeed, Russia’s main task may be pressuring China to support sanctions.)

The trick is to ensure that the Iranians don’t get away with “window dressing” diplomacy - that is, giving the appearance that they’re meeting internationaldemands, while actuality not giving away much at all.

The first such test will come soon - Iran has promised to give the IAEA access to interview Iran’s nuclear scientists.  The international coalition must insist that the interviews take place on the IAEA’s terms:  likely outside of Iran, for as long as the IAEA requests, and covering whatever topics are deemed necessary.

Next, the international coalition should push for IAEA access to all Iranian nuclear sites, and couple refused access with broad sanctions on imports of refined gas.

These will be the first important steps to learning if even a fault-ridden Iranian regime can be an honest partner.

We’ve heard this all before, right?  That the UN is about to “get tough with Iran” for its nuclear program.  Three times previously the world’s governing body has imposed sanctions on Tehran for its hush-hush uranian enrichment facilities, and three times previously those sanctions have been generally ineffective, focusing on items like arms sales and financial assets hidden abroad.

But this time, the UN is serious.  Really.  The difference is in the proposed sanctions’ target:    Iran’s imported gasoline.  You might object by stating that Iran has plenty of its own gas, and why would the mullahs possibly need to import any? Seems silly, even.  But a critical lack of petroleum refineries in-country means that Iran actually buys some 40 percent of its commercial-ready fuel from abroad.  Blocking those imports would significantly increase prices for electricity and transportation.  The UN is hoping that the resulting public outcry from higher prices could prove to be the action-forcing mechanism that gets Tehran to the nuclear bargaining table.  The good news is that Ahmadinejad has signaled a willingness to talk, even if he claims that Iran’s nuclear program is off the table.  Gasoline sanctions might just open up that topic as well.

Of course, the UN is running a risk - Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez has promised to export 20,000 barrels a day of refined gasoline to Iran to provide a strategic reserve cushion before sanctions take effect.  It’s unclear whether that’s enough to dampen the price-rises, but if so, Ahmadinejad may attempt deflect public anger at West for his country’s ills.

But this time, your average Iranian is in a less tolerant mood.  Following June’s sham presidential election and subsequent massive street protests, Ahmadinejad’s attempts to pin the sanctions on Washington will fall on more skeptical, and perhaps outright distrustful, ears.  Under the right conditions, it’s conceivable that Ahmadinejad could misread the public mood entirely and re-ignite June’s protests.

That’s why these sanctions are the right move:  Iran probably wants to talk, and the sanctions put a price on Iranian inaction.  Furthermore, they target Iran’s pressure point better than their predecessors, and do so at a time when Tehran is on shakey ground with its public.

Former Libyan intelligence agent Abdelbaset Ali Mohamed al Megrahi is the only person ever successfully prosecuted for the PanAm 103 Lockerbie bombing.  In Scottish prison since 2001, al Magrahi has contracted cancer; doctors estimate he has about three months to live.

He appealed to Scottish authorities for release on humanitarian grounds, hoping to die in Libya surrounded by his family.  Under normal circumstances, the appeal should be rejected without a second thought:  a man convicted in a court of law for the senseless murder of 270 people should never be released, no matter how sick he is.  In that vein, top officials in the United States and Britain have strenuously protested al Megrahi’s release to the Scots.

Yet today, the release went through.  Why?

Consider the charges of Scottish National Party MP Christine Grahame, who claims that

It’s been well know to the UK government that the person and country behind this has nothing to do with Libya or al-Megrahi, but is connected at the start to the US shooting down of an Iranian airbus by a US battle cruiser just months before.

[click here and scroll to the August 19 BBC Global News podcast where Grahame makes her charges]

Whoa. She sounds absolutely bonkers, right?

Well, perhaps not.  What if there were doubts about al-Magrahi’s guilt?

Et voila: Al-Megrahi has instructed his lawyers to produce several US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) cables that implicate Iran.  The DIA memos suggest Iran was behind the attack, which the memos conclude was conducted in response to “the shooting down of an Iranian commercial airliner by the USS Vincennes, an American warship, five months earlier.”  (To read up on the fate of Iran Air flight 655, click here.  290 Iranians died in the 1988 incident.)

Another DIA document says the bombing was authorized and financed by Ali-Akbar Mohtashemi-Pur, Iran’s former Interior Minister, and that the operation was contracted from Tehran to Ahmad Jibril, leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, for $1million.

Still sound a bit nutty?  It would to me, too, if I hadn’t read the DIA’s documents.

In the interest of full disclosure, I can’t verify that I’ve read exactly the same memos to which al Megrahi’s lawyers are referring.  However, in approximately mid-2003, I took part in a DIA counter-terrorism training course.  As the course’s final exercise, class participants were broken into teams to analyze a simulated “developing terrorist plot.”  Guess which one they chose?  Bingo - Lockerbie.  And guess who the plot is tied back to?  No bonus points if you say Ahmad Jibril, the PLFP-GC commander, because you should have figured that out by now.

So why hasn’t Jibril been charged?  Apparently, they tried:

Dick Marquise, chief of the FBI “Scotbom Task Force” from 1988-1992, said investigators could find nothing later to link [Jibril] with Lockerbie.

“We never found any evidence,” he told the BBC. “There’s a lot of information, there’s a lot of intelligence that people have said there were meetings, there were discussions.

“But not one shred of evidence that a prosecutor could take into court to convict either an official in Iran or Ahmed Jibril for blowing up Pan Am flight 103.“  [Emphasis mine]

In essense, this cuts to the heart of the matter–the difference between law enforcement (FBI) and intelligence (DIA) work.  Just because the raw intelligence points to one individual doesn’t mean that it is, or should be, admissible in court.  The sources and methods used to collect intelligence are protected; without a special declassification request (apparently pending), the US government had no reason to provide it to the prosecuting authorities.

Nor does this intelligence mean that Jibril is 100 percent guilty and al Megrahi 100 percent innocent:  al Megrahi could have quite possibly had a hand in the bombing as a contracted operative.  But I believe it has created enough doubt about al-Megrahi’s case to release him on humanitarian grounds as he nears the end of his life.

Furthermore, the United States and Britain are well within their rights to protest Megrahi’s release.  As far as these authorities know, Megrahi’s legal conviction stands firm unless and until his case is overturned by a full legal review with declassified intelligence.

Finally, should Iran be legally implicated, the issue could turn into a political hot potato.  President Obama has obviously signalled a willingness to open communication with Tehran, and even more blood on the mullahs’ hands could provide ample political fodder for the president’s opponents.  However, that shouldn’t be a dealbreaker:  Iran and the United States have much to negotiate, and this issue should be folded in with the multitude of topics to be discussed.  And if the White House is cagey, it could use the case as an American bargaining chip.

I like Joe Klein’s take:

This emphasis on the nuclear issue is disproportionate. Iran is allowed to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. … But let’s assume the worst: say Iran is working on a bomb; say it acquires one in the next few years. Only Benjamin Netanyahu and assorted American neoconservatives believe — or pretend to believe — that Iran might actually use it, given Israel’s overpowering ability to strike back. …

To be sure, an Iranian bomb would not be a good thing. … But it would not be cataclysmic, either — unless Obama decided to pre-empt it militarily. In any case, the question is, Does the President really want to paint himself into this corner? Does he want to face the possibility of going to war or, more likely, retreating from his insistence on a bomb-free Iran?

A wiser alternative may be to stand down, for a while. “Turn away and whistle,” an Iranian academic suggested recently. Don’t abandon the nuclear-sanctions process, but don’t force it, either. Don’t pursue negotiations. Let the disgraced Iranian government pursue us, as it might, in order to rebuild credibility at home and in the world — and then make sure the regime’s interest isn’t just for show. After all, Iran isn’t the most frightening nuclear challenge we’re facing. That would be the next country over, Pakistan.

On substance, I agree with most of what Joe says — Iran isn’t the next Soviet Union, and this debate desperately needs some cold agua thrown on it — but I do question the extent to which Iran is willing to pursue the United States, at least at first.  We may get to that point, but it will be a rocky road for a while — I think the mullahs would prefer forcing the Obama administration to the negotiating table in the same manner the North Koreans do — by firing off a few tests and hoping we get nervous.  And if Obama reacts to this, Iran negotiates from somewhat of a position of strength.

The only antidote is patience.  White House needs a ton of it, and American political pressures typically don’t allow for that.  Obama has shown himself to be pretty cool under the 24 hour news cycle pressure, and Iran’s sabre rattling after a sham election might leverage weapons development as the next test.