In today’s Washington Post, an anonymous intelligence official talked about the intelligence community’s role in the attempted Christmas bombing:

Anyone who believes that a relatively small organization like NCTC [National Counterterrorism Center] is going to connect every electron in each of those 30 databases is either disingenuous or naive, and certainly knows very little about how intelligence analysis actually works.

Bingo! We as a public have to reorient our expectations about the intelligence community’s ability to ensure 100 percent security on a 24/7/365 basis. That’s not a knock on intelligence pros. As a former intel analyst, I’ve seen time and time again just how unrealistic the expectations are.

While individual quotes that dumb down the intelligence community’s capabilities are illustrative, they fail to drive home how difficult intel work really is. I think it’s more useful to examine what it’s actually like to “connect the dots” in the case of a potential terrorist operative. From my own experience, here’s how it works:

I’d receive a lead from the CIA Station in Rabat, Morocco, about a potential bad guy. For the purposes of this explanation, let’s say he’s a Moroccan named Abdul Aziz Mohammed Abu Sayaf, but I don’t know anything else about him, such as his date or place of birth. (I chose that name not because I want to stereotype all “terrorists” as Arab or because he’s an actual bad guy, but because – as I explain in detail below – it will help illustrate a point about transliteration’s role in analysis of suspected terrorists specifically from Muslim countries.)

My goal is to find out everything we know about this individual and determine whether he’s a legitimate threat. This is no small point — in order to raise the alarm, I need definitive intelligence corroboration that the individual in question has a reported history that solidifies him as a potential danger. In other words, we don’t just arrest people because of a single report from a source of unknown quality. For the record, 99 percent of the time, walk-in sources to U.S. Embassies are of poor-to-unknown quality. That includes friends and family members who walk into the embassy and claim their relatives are potential dangers. Why? Family relations are tangled webs, and who really knows if your uncle just might want you arrested in revenge for that unsettled family land dispute.

Therefore, I’ll take his name and plug it into NCTC’s terrorism search, a database that stores more information about terrorism suspects than you could ever imagine. Most of the information is contained in reports from the CIA, NSA, DoD, State Department, and foreign intelligence services that have shared with us. The reports range in length from just a paragraph or two about a specific individual, to tens upon tens of pages long of names, aliases, and birth dates of “suspected” individuals about whom these suspicions are undefined (thank the Italians for this).

“Abdul Aziz Mohammed Abu Sayaf” goes in the old database, and presto-changeo, 27 reports come back. I tear through them for information that matches what I know about my guy. Say I can throw out 22 of the reports because they’re all about an “Abul Aziz Mohammed Abu Sayaf” who lives in Indonesia and was arrested in 2004 and is now in jail.

That leaves five reports. Four are about an Egyptian. Out. And the last one is about some guy of the same name in an unknown country who doesn’t appear to have really done anything wrong. I’m interested in the last one, but need much information on him before taking action.

Here’s where it gets fun. Since there may be more information out there, I start looking for variations of Abul Aziz Mohammed Abu Sayaf’s name, as names like Aziz, Mohammed, and Sayaf can be spelled several different ways when transliterated into English from Arabic. But rather than guess at which combination of the spellings works in our guy’s case, I would enter into the database, “Abdul Aziz* M*h*m*d Abu Say*af*,” which accounts for the different vowels and multiple consonants that may be used in variant spellings.

The result? 2,453 new reports to comb through!

I would logically cut that number down by entering what little other information I know about this guy. Next search: “Abdul Aziz* M*h*m*d Abu Say*af* AND Morocco.” Down to 372. Next search: “Abdul Aziz* M*h*m*d Abu Say*af* AND Morocco adj! 20,” which means all of the above words must appear within 20 words of one another. Down to 87.

I diligently read or skim through all the 87 reports looking for any nugget of information that could corroborate the suspicions about our man. Perhaps I find an additional report or two about an individual who might be the person in question, but I can only say that with 50 percent confidence.

The end result is that I write another report saying only what I can definitively conclude:

Abdul Aziz Mohammed Abu Sayaf is suspected of wanting to enter the United States to conduct a terrorist attack. Sources of unknown quality indicate Abu Sayaf is interested in traveling this month, though it remains unknown whether Abdul Aziz Mohammed Abu Sayaf is a credible threat to the United States.

I file my report, and the receiving officer – given limited resources to follow leads – deems my report interesting, but not urgent.

Two days later, an individual named Abdull-Aziz Muhammad Abou Sayyaff buys a ticket on a flight to Newark and tries to detonate an explosive belt on board. With hindsight, it’s easy to point out the flaws in my analytic process: Should the name spelling be uniform? Why did you limit your search so much? This is national security – you mean to tell me you can’t be bothered to read 327 reports? Shouldn’t we chase down every lead?  And etc… sigh.

These are easy and obvious criticisms. And certainly, some improvements can and will continue to be made. However, given the vast amount of American and internationally derived information, the pressing need to run down several searches like this on any work day, and the permanent resource constraints, these are also criticisms by those who don’t understand the tremendous complexity of intelligence work and the diminishing marginal returns of hiring thousands more additional analysts.

In short, finding bad guys is often like looking for grains of sugar on a beach. Unfortunately, we have to accept that we might not find them all.

With the news that Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab was linked to, and possibly directed by, a group called Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), there’s much apprehension and confusion about this allegedly “new” offshoot of Osama Bin Laden’s group.

Though I’m usually not one to lead the charge against “the media”, I’ve been most disappointed by the lack of explanation about the differences in organization, targets, intentions, and capabilities between the group based in Yemen and the one along the Af-Pak border.

Let’s get the obvious but oft-unstated out of the way:  Though AQAP may trace some of its origins to the AQSL-directed 2000 bombing of the USS COLE, today AQAP is a distinct, separate entity from Osama Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda (which is commonly referred to throughout the intelligence community as Al Qaeda Senior Leadership, or AQSL).  AQAP may share a general ideological affiliation with AQSL, but - most significantly - its specific targeting intentions and attack capabilites may vary significantly.  Furthermore, AQAP’s leadership is largely independent to do as it pleases, and though it may receive occasional communications and guidance from Osama Bin Laden’s cadre, AQAP is essentially free to follow or ignore it as it may seem fit.

The best move AQAP is adopting the “al Qaeda” brand.  Franchising AQ is a no-brainer:  the group in Yemen and Saudi can not only entice finances and recruits to its organization on the al Qaeda name, but it also strikes fear world-wide as pundits, hosts, and articles flippantly repeat the name as if the group were under direct orders and possessed similar strike capabilities as Al Qaeda’s Senior Leadership back in 2001.

So what are AQAP’s intents and capabilities?  The group certainly shares an obvious anti-American/anti-”Western” bent, along with its Af-Pak based bretherin.  Since 2003, AQAP has launched several attacks against employees of Western petroleum countries, tourists, and the American embassy and consulate.  But whereas AQSL is focused on large-scale attacks against US soil, the Arabian Peninsula group has a primary motivation of toppling the Saudi and Yemeni regimes, and likely views these American/Western targets as not quite as important.

“But what about the Christmas Day plot?” you ask, “that seems like a pretty serious attempt to kill Americans on American soil.”  True, it does.  However, note that the plot failed.  It’s an important point because since successful terrorism plots are the marriage of a group’s intention to hit a particular target plus its capability to do so, on that score, AQAP failed.  It is quite easy to have a lone operative like Abdulmutallab volunteer to conduct an attack, and the groups leadership provide him the basic training and materiel to execute it.  But the fact that the bomber and explosives were incompetent and/or faulty respectively speaks volumes about AQAP’s lack of capability to conduct anything close to a 9/11 style attack from a Yemeni safe-haven.  Of course, since the group has displayed its intention to target Americans in America, the group should merit close attention for improving operational capability.

Yet AQAP still succeeded in exploiting the media value of even a failed operation.  And that, in a word, is amazing.  If we continue to let partisan political bickering drive security policy, then fledgling groups like AQAP continue to win as they gain fame and notarity.  It’s even more incredible that Republicans have the audacity to politically exploit nearly uncloseable gaps in America’s defensive net as it was their president who constructed its architecture in the first place.

Crossposted at The Progressive Fix.

Three cheers for Dick Durbin, the senior senator from Illinois.

Rather than offering shrill, partisan talking points at the prospect of closing the Guantanamo prison - equal parts Islamic extremist recruiting tool as well as human rights stain on our national psyche - Senator Durbin has consistently offered pragmatic progressive voice that is steadfast in his resolve to close Gitmo and ensure the security of the country.  The result is today’s announcement that the administration will likely open the detention facility in Thompson, Illinois as the destination for many of Guantanamo’s detainees.

When conservatives were doing their best Chicken Little impersonation about the alleged perils of bringing hardened terrorists to American soil, Durbin rebuffed Dick Cheney and Newt Gingrich, calmly telling NBC’s David Gregory on Meet the Press that:

Continuing Guantanamo, unfortunately, makes our troops less safe.  The bottom line as I see it is Guantanamo should close in an orderly way. … The fact is that closing Guantanamo, that announcement by the president, as well as abandoning torture techniques and so-called enhanced interrogation, finally said to the rest of the world that it’s a new day.  Join us in a new approach to keeping this world and America safe.  I think it was a break from the past we desperately needed.

[W]hen we checked with the director of FBI, Mr. Mueller, he said there’s no question that supermax facilities, not a single escape, we limit the communication of these detainees and prisoners, and we can continue to do that. …

I’d be OK with them in a supermax facility, because we’ve never had an escape from one.  And as I said, we have over 340 convicted terrorists now being held safely in our prisons.  I just don’t hear anyone suggesting releasing them or sending them to another country.  That isn’t part of the prospect that we have before us. …

With this stance, Durbin shows how rational solutions can stand with both American values and security: closing Guantanamo is a moral and security imperative, and the idea that America’s safety is threatened when terrorists are in supermax facilities is nothing more than political scare tactics.

And as a result, it looks like job-starved Illinois will be rewarded in the process.  The state will retro-fit the empty Thompson prison to meet the new security standards, and then have to staff the facility full time once open.  Thompson sits in Carroll County, IL, where unemployment rests at 11.1 percent; a refurbished facility could bring as many as 3,000 jobs.

And though this is anecdotal evidence, I asked Mike Satlak - my college buddy, Oswego, IL resident (120 miles from Thompson), and in the interest of full disclosure, Dick Durbin fan - about the prospect of moving prisoners to rural Illinois.  “I’m not scared at all of any security threat, and Thompson could really use the jobs.”

President Obama’s speech last night was — to state the obvious — a tough one to give. Just think of the many constituencies the president had to address: not only the American public, but the military who have been in need of some direction, the Democratic base, terminally cranky Republicans, the Karzai government, the Pakistani government, and Bozo the Clown to boot. No one constituency would be fully pleased.

We all know that President Obama gives a wonderfully inspiring speech. I had a hunch that this address would not fall into that category. Rather than inspiring the public to work towards a distant American nirvana (as he did in the March 2008 Philadelphia race speech), West Point was more of a sales job.

With all that in mind, I was looking for the president to discuss five major topics:

1. Make a case for why we were in Afghanistan.

2. Explain our forces’ mission.

3. Address how he would work with the Karzai government.

4. Clearly outline the strategy for Pakistan.

5. State his interpretation of an exit strategy.

To put a “grade” on it, I’d give the president 3.5/5. Here’s why.

First, I thought he made a compelling case reminding Americans of why we’re there. He spent the first several paragraphs going over the history of what led us to this point. That’s been the toughest issue for much of hard left to grapple with — America has clear national security interests in Afghanistan, and it is unfortunate, but necessary, to enact a robust strategy to ensure the country’s safety.

It’s a rationale that has been so difficult for some to accept. Writing in the New York Review of Books, Garry Wills says:

[Obama] said that he would not oppose war in general, but dumb wars. On that basis, we went for him. And now he betrays us. Although he talked of a larger commitment to Afghanistan during his campaign, he has now officially adopted his very own war, one with all the disqualifications that he attacked in the Iraq engagement. This war too is a dumb one.

But it’s not a dumb war. It’s a necessary one, and I struggle to understand why Mr. Wills has become so disenchanted with President Obama over this decision when even he acknowledges that the president campaigned pledging a “larger commitment” to Afghanistan. This shouldn’t have come as a surprise.

Second, I didn’t think the president went far enough in explaining the counter-insurgency strategy that American forces would be undertaking. To me, he missed an opportunity to explain that our forces are there to promote peace by protecting the Afghan population from the Taliban. So only half a point there.

Third, I was impressed with the president’s emphasis on working with and around the Karzai government. His particular emphasis on “Afghan ministries, governors, and local leaders” indicated the White House’s recognition that bypassing Kabul is an effective part to regional development across the whole country. A full point from me.

Fourth, the Pakistan strategy was certainly mentioned, if not emphasized, as one of the pathways to a successful disengagement. Sure, as the president said, we will “strengthen Pakistan’s capacity to target those groups that threaten our countries, and have made it clear that we cannot tolerate a safe haven for terrorists whose location is known and whose intentions are clear.” Yes, we know it’s necessary, but I have a nagging sense that the “how” hasn’t been worked out yet. The White House’s overture on a comprehensive partnership deal with Pakistan is encouraging, but only part of the solution – a half-point.

Ah, and finally, that exit strategy. I would have preferred that our exit from Afghanistan be measured in terms of progress, not calendar dates, which merits a half-point deduction. I think David Ignatius came very close to summing up my feelings:

Obama thinks that setting deadlines will force the Afghans to get their act together at last. That strikes me as the most dubious premise of his strategy. He is telling his adversary that he will start leaving on a certain date, and telling his ally to be ready to take over then, or else. That’s the weak link in an otherwise admirable decision — the idea that we strengthen our hand by announcing in advance that we plan to fold it.

For a speech that was sure to please no one entirely, I thought it was a brave attempt at explaining a tough, unpopular, but ultimately correct decision.

It looks like the White House is circling in on a new strategy in Afghanistan that focuses on protecting major population centers like Kabul, Kandahar, Mazar-i-Sharif, Kunduz, Herat, Jalalabad, and a few other large villages.

If endorsed, it would adopt the major elements of General McChrystal’s proposed counterinsurgency strategy, albeit it on a more limited scale that perhaps acknowledges  40,000 additional troops aren’t enough to effectively pacify the entire country.  Or, as the NYT put it:

At the heart of this strategy is the conclusion that the United States cannot completely eradicate the insurgency in a nation where the Taliban is an indigenous force — nor does it need to in order to protect American national security. Instead, the focus would be on preventing Al Qaeda from returning in force while containing and weakening the Taliban long enough to build Afghan security forces that would eventually take over the mission.

This strategy would certainly prevent the Taliban from regaining control of the country, thereby denying Al Qaeda the petri dish it needs to reconstitute an ability to attack the United States.

Furthermore, this is a realistic approach about what we can achieve, even with increased - but finite - resources.  It may simply not be a sensible use of resources to deploy tens of thousands of American forces to Helmand, a massive southern province that has 20 percent of the land, but only three percent of the population.

However, the fundamental question for me is would this strategy effectively cede control over large swaths of the country to the Taliban where al Qaeda elements could re-enter and rebuild its abilities.  One senior administration addressed that point, saying, “We are not talking about surrendering the rest of the country to the Taliban.”

But under this scenario in Helmand, field commanders would compensate for the lack of a full-time troop presence by keeping pressure on insurgents with drone strike, aided  intelligence from local populations about pockets of Taliban.  But by ceding control to the Taliban, we could be alienating the local population — the eyes and ears necessary to target the drones.

And finally, a potential side-effect of protecting select urban areas is that as the only stable regions, they might be flooded by rural villagers that don’t want to live under the Taliban.  Would this increase the burden on troops to the point that their presence has diminishing returns as the cities swell with refugees?

Consider me cautiously optimistic, but nervous.

I’ve been pretty tardy about posting stuff to AOM of late, and for that, I apologize.  As I alluded to earlier, we’re starting to transition to The Progressive Fix here at the PPI, and I’m imagining - but not certain - that AOM will  be gobbled up by that site.  Sigh.

But for now, the hits keep coming.  I had a two-fer on Friday, with the RCP piece as well as this article in Foreign Policy.  Here’s a tease. Enjoy:

As deliberations about the Obama administration’s strategic direction in Afghanistan unfold, the White House is weighing whether al Qaeda, in fact, needs an Afghan safe haven — an expanse of land under the protection of the Taliban — to reconstitute its capability to attack the United States. Many noted scholars doubt it. In a recent Washington Post op-ed, Council on Foreign Relations President Richard Haass bluntly stated, “Al Qaeda does not require Afghan real estate to constitute a regional or global threat.”

He’s wrong. Although the group has been significantly weakened since late 2001, the only chance al Qaeda has of rebuilding its capability to conduct a large-scale terrorist operation against the United States is under the Taliban’s umbrella of protection.

Will Marshall and I have a piece up over at RealClear Politics on Dems and Afghanistan.

Here’s the upshot (read the whole enchillada here):

President Obama faces tough decisions on Afghanistan, but his party is on the hot seat too. Afghanistan is the first real test since Vietnam of Democrats’ collective ability to manage a major armed conflict. Just how to do that is the subject of an intense internal debate. Whatever the strategy, his party must avoid a convulsive split that would cast doubt on its ability to secure the country. Last March, Obama said his goal is to prevent al Qaeda from launching attacks on America. His handpicked commander, General McChrystal, is asking for up to 40,000 additional troops for a counterinsurgency campaign to achieve the president’s goal.

…

Let’s be clear: We’re not arguing that Obama should make his decision based on a desire to “look tough” on national security. We’re saying Democrats ought to think long and hard before forsaking a war that Obama has defined, both during the campaign and as president, as necessary to Americans’ security.

Obama and his party have a once-in-a-generation opportunity to consolidate a new progressive governing majority. But to do that, they must govern effectively. That means offering coherent and credible strategies for American safety, and the stamina to stick with them. For his party no less than for President Obama, Afghanistan will be the acid test.